

Disorder: Contemporary Fascism and the Crisis in Mental Health

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By

Emma Dane York

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Dean
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University of Saskatchewan
116 Thorvaldson Building, 110 Science Place
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5C9
Canada

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Second World War and the many expressions of Fascist ideology that arose during this time period, many European philosophers explored the relationship between psychology, emotions, and politics. In analyzing Fascism, philosophers such as Erich Fromm, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Michel Foucault, focused on the social nature of psychology, and they also went a step further in connecting this analysis to the psychological “costs” of capitalism, up to and including Fascism. The threat of Fascism remains a contemporary concern, but a problem that arises in applying their critiques and understandings to psychology and politics today are new technologies, and the dominance of the bio-medical model of mental health. To understand the relevance of these authors today, this thesis first uses an epistemological approach to locate the bio-medical model as a theory of knowledge, and secondly, a historical approach is used to consider the common concern of Fascism that motivated these philosophers to delve into the connections between psychology and Fascism. By threading these distinct approaches and motivations together, this thesis moves beyond simply an epistemological critique of positivism, but instead suggests that by framing mental health in this model we also discount the role of emotions in politics—which is even more crucial to understand in times of political-economic instability. As many places in Europe and North America see either a resurgence or reinvention of Fascist ideology and organizations, the causes and consequences of epidemic mental illness (panic, depression, anxiety, and addiction), become ever more necessary to examine, along with what makes a “sane society.”

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Introduction

In the aftermath of the Second World War and the many expressions of Fascist ideology that arose during this time period, many European philosophers explored the relationship between psychology, emotions, and politics, in the service of understanding how such supposedly “civilized” nations could perpetuate barbarous and genocidal actions against each other. Fascism broke the illusion of continual progress that had defined the imagined trajectory of many of these countries and “its atmosphere [was] one of brutal violence and psychic shocks” (Suvin, 2017, 261). In analyzing this phenomenon, many political theorists and philosophers found it necessary to delve into psychological explanations to account for the rise of Fascism, some examples being crowd psychology and the attraction to “strong man” leaders. While philosophers such as Erich Fromm, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Michel Foucault, focused on the social nature of psychology, and they also went a step further in connecting this analysis to the psychological “costs” of capitalism, up to and including Fascism. For Fromm, who came from a psychoanalytic and Marxist tradition, Fascism was connected to the death drive, and the subsequent denial or denigration of life, but was also related to a class-based “social character.” In Foucault's works Fascism had its origins in bio-politics and ideas from psychiatric history such as eugenics and degeneration theory, which justified state racism and extreme violence in order to maintain a certain “social body.” In Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy Fascism was the result of the “fascist in all of us,” or socially produced Fascist desire, and the everyday corrupting influences of hierarchy, domination, and power. Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari have different criticisms, purposes, and scopes in their work, but they all share a common purpose in taking psychology out of the realm of individual and biological disorder, to a social and cultural phenomenon, which is informed by a broader critique of capitalism, or at the very least structures of power.

While an issue such as the threat of Fascism remains a contemporary concern, the main problem that arises in applying these critiques and understandings to psychology and politics today are new technologies, which facilitate a data-driven, bio-medical model of mental illness, making even standard human emotions as subject to quantification. To understand the relevance of these authors today, first an epistemological approach will be used to locate the bio-medical model as a theory of knowledge, and secondly, a historical approach will be used to consider the

common concern of Fascism that motivated these philosophers to delve into the connections between emotions, psychology, and politics. As many places in Europe and North America see either a resurgence or reinvention of Fascist ideology and organizations, the causes and consequences of epidemic mental illness (panic, depression, anxiety, and addiction), become ever more necessary to examine, along with what makes a “sane society.”

This thesis is set up to explore the commonalities in the critiques of these authors that led them to connect the seemingly disparate realms of psychology and Fascism, as well as what these writings can offer today in the context of both a growing mental health crisis and the resurgence of Fascist ideologies and organizations. A brief discussion on the mental health crisis in Canada and a few recent epidemiological studies demonstrates the empirical reality and scope of this problem. Looking into the development of psychology reveals insight into how and why the positivist approach to knowledge coincided with psychology being cemented as a discipline. The debate on Fascism will briefly be explored in order to provide greater conceptual clarity between what can be called “Historical Fascism” and theorizing Fascist ideology today. The overview and analysis of Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari takes place on an epistemological level to illuminate their critiques of psychology and psychiatry, and a second historical approach contextualizes these authors and their understandings of Fascism. The comparative analysis in this thesis shows that the main tension in these works is between the necessity of affirming or critiquing Humanism on one level and the concern with programmatic or political applications of their work on the other. On the historical side of the comparative analysis, all the works under study are in alignment with the position that Fascist ideology and organization is part of a social subjectivity, but how this subjectivity and psychology develops differs. In applying these critiques to a contemporary context, a later essay by Deleuze and the recent work of Byung-Chul Han will give some insight into how these theoretical threads have been reinvented to respond to the changing economic and institutional realities of neoliberal and financial capitalism, but this section on new developments will also offer a critique to Han's work in problematizing his idea of “self-exploitation” and the “achievement-subject.” In finally returning to the problem of the resurgence of Fascist ideology and movements, the conclusions drawn from this work point to the necessity in taking emotions seriously in the development of an alternative future or more “sane society.”

Fromm has a large body of work, but both *Escape from Freedom* (1941) and *The Sane Society* (1955) are two key texts for the purposes of this thesis. Both of these major works as well as several essays from Fromm attempted to account for the rise of Fascism in many supposedly free and democratic European nations. Fromm wrote about Fascism from both a psychoanalytic and Marxist perspective. In looking at both the affects of alienation and the death drive, Fromm claimed in his essay “Prophets and Priests,” that; “there is indeed no greater distinction among human beings than that between those who love life and those who love death” (1967, 56). *The Sane Society*, one of Fromm's main works on social psychology, describes the damaging consequences of consumerism and alienation on the human *psyche* (soul). Fromm attempted to look at the “pathology of normalcy,” meaning that rather than defining health through the pathology of those who are labelled as sick, his work suggested that the normative values of a society could themselves be “unhealthy.” Fromm used *Alienation* in a specific and Marxist sense, and defined Alienation's primary modes of expression as quantification and abstraction, in order to describe how mental distress occurred collectively. For Fromm, Alienation separates human beings from their own human nature and potential, which he defined in normative and Humanist, rather than sociologically relative terms.

Like Fromm, Michel Foucault also investigated the concepts of abnormality/normality, and psychiatric power, but would define these structures as falling under larger frameworks of *bio-power*. Though coming to the study of Fascism from a different generation, it is evident in Foucault's work that he was also concerned with the possible resurgence of Fascism, and what he titled “the fascism in all of us,” that causes humans to “desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (1977, xiii). Foucault's earliest work *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (1961, Eng. 1965) is a key text in critical perspectives on psychiatry and medicine that studied historical and subversive conceptions of Madness in Europe. The text connected the rise of institutionalization to the “Great Confinement” of Europe, in which poor laws criminalized poverty and based membership in society on the ability to work and be productive in ways which benefited the transition to capitalism. This aspect of Foucault's work shows continuities between the bio-politics of neoliberalism and the extreme bio-politics of Nazism/Fascism, where many disabled, and mentally ill people, or just those labelled as “anti-social” were described as economically bad investments and termed *Unnütze Esser* (useless eaters), or simply *Lebensunwertes Lebens* (life unworthy of life). Foucault claimed that as

Madness disappeared and mental illness became the primary way of diagnosing and conceptualizing mental distress, the possibility of dialogue between reason and unreason ended. Those defined as less sane, were purveyors of “unreason.” Foucault's *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974* and *History of Sexuality* volume one are also necessary to include in this reading of Foucault to get a sense of how his understandings of these topics shifted. While these works also focused on the role of institutions, medicine, and subjectivity, Foucault did not quite return to his earliest theorizing on the deviance of madness, believing that the labels of mental illness eroded any subversive possibility these subjectivities previously had. To see Madness as possible would be to admit that there was an “outside,” or a marginal space apart from bio-politics and mechanisms of power, and Foucault increasingly claimed that “the margin is a myth” (Pelbart, 2000, 204).

The third theoretical contribution to be studied is the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. The first book of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* titled *Anti-Oedipus* (1972, Eng. 1977), like Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*, also examined Fascism. It did so by looking at how desire is a social phenomenon, which can operate repressively, and cause individuals to actively desire their own subjugation. *Anti-Oedipus* was described by Foucault as both a “book of ethics” and the “Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life” (1972, xiii). The second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* titled *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980, Eng. 1981) explains ideas of multiplicity which are relevant to their understanding of the psyche and expands on related concepts like the Body without Organs. Through their study of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari critiqued how the Freudian theory of the Oedipal complex centered so much of human psychology around the role of the nuclear family and its reproduction. Deleuze and Guattari defined their work as a “materialist psychiatry,” and claimed that there is no psychic reality which exists apart from the social production of reality, or that emotions and desires do not exist independently of economic or social life. As with the work of both Fromm and Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari questioned the neutrality and objectivity of positivist epistemology, writing that “scientific knowledge as nonbelief is truly the last refuge of belief” (1977, 111). Prior to the 1980s, psychoanalytic theory and the “talking cure” were the main methods of identifying and coping with mental disorder in patients. However, drugs and pharmaceuticals were in use long before “Big Pharma” was identified as a growing problem in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorder. While many of Deleuze and Guattari's social and political critiques continue to be relevant, the disappearance

of psychoanalysis and dominance of the bio-medical model means that their critiques of positivism in psychology will have more application today.

The New “Normal,” or a Mental Health Crisis?

In turning now to a brief outline of the scale of the problems in mental health, in Canada it is suggested that 1/5 Canadians a year experience a mental health or addiction problem, and that by the age of 40, 1 in 2 have or have had a mental illness (CAMH, 2018). The way these disorders are diagnosed and expressed is gendered, with men having higher rates of addiction and women having higher rates of mood and anxiety disorders. Given the high rates of these statistics, it is not surprising that mental illness is classified as the leading cause of disability in Canada. The rate of addiction in Canada (which should also be considered around discussions of mental health) suggests that 21.6% of people meet the criteria for a substance disorder in their lifetime (Statistics Canada, 2012). For one example on the front of health and addiction, Canada is the 2nd highest consumer of opioids per-capita in the world, and in 2017 alone around 4,000 people died from fentanyl/opioid-related deaths in Canada, making this one issue alone a serious national health crisis (Canadian Press, 2017). There is also a noted overlap or “comorbidity” between mental health problems and addiction, as those diagnosed with a mental illness are also twice as likely to have a substance use or addiction problem.

In examining statistics for suicide in Canada it is estimated that 4,000 people a year commit suicide, or 11 people a day (CMHA, 2018). Canada has some of the highest suicide rates in the world when looking at Inuit youth, who take their lives at a rate that is 11x the national average (CFMS, 2017). Overall Indigenous youth in Canada are 5-6x more likely to die by suicide than non-Indigenous youth (CFMS, 2017). Populations in Canada that experience high rates of mental illness also include the homeless and those who are incarcerated. In the U.K., data from the NHS shows that rates of mental illness are rising among girls and young women, and that 3/4 of all anti-depressants are being prescribed to girls between the ages of 13-17 (Sacks-Jones, 2017). This is a non-exhaustive, but current list of statistics which helps frame the scale of these issues and already suggests there is a clear link between mental health outcomes and the experience of violence.

That mental health outcomes are also connected to class and that economic disturbances correlate with an increase in mental illness or disorder has been well documented. An economic depression therefore can more literally denote depression. Low income Canadians are 3-4 times more likely to report poor to fair mental health than those in the highest income (CAMH). This is also not a Canadian phenomenon; international epidemiological studies, such as one done by Roger Wilkinson and Kate Pickett suggested that societies with less income inequality had lower rates of mental illness. According to Wilkinson and Pickett and their study of mental disorders in the United States, “if over the next 50 years the extremely unequal U.S.A. were to change its income distribution to that of more equal Japan or Spain, the rate of mental disorders would drop by half” (Wright, 2014). A recent epidemiological study of Greece shows that between the years 2010-2012 the suicide rate rose by 35%, especially between those of working age, suggesting a clear correlation between the imposition of economic austerity and mental health outcomes (Rachiotis et al, 2015). From the perspective of these studies, by de-contextualizing common mental illnesses like depression or anxiety or making these into strictly an individual-biological problem, social and political problems like lack of support, community, and the destructive consequences of economic policies like austerity do not get assigned the responsibility they deserve for causing such widespread social suffering.

When mental health statistics and the severity of the mental illness epidemic are reported on or discussed in relation to the economy, they are instead often linked to an economic “cost” or burden to the society and healthcare system as a whole. In Canada, mental illness is framed as “costing” the country at least 50 billion dollars in GDP a year (Picard, 2013). This cost-benefit analysis goes so far as to economize depression and anxiety to calculate how much they impact the GDP. The Conference Board of Canada suggests we can deduce that depression causes Canada to lose 32.3 billion dollars in GDP every year, while anxiety causes Canadians to lose 17.3 billion dollars in GDP per year (Mortillaro, 2016). The state of the healthcare system itself is one issue, but the loss of work hours, motivation, and productivity that a deep depression may bring on is portrayed as an even more pressing societal concern. This narrative suggests that addressing mental illness will allow the economy to run more smoothly, and the GDP will increase, ignoring the reality that these mental illnesses occurred in an economic framework which remains unaltered, or that they may have a social function within that system.

The idea that normative judgements and morals are implicit in the practice of psychology and psychiatry is not new. According to Ronald B. Miller, “by reducing moral views to simple biases and prejudices, scientific psychology is able to easily dismiss the relevance of moral issues to psychological investigation” (2004, 24). In Miller’s view, psychology as a discipline evolved out of philosophy, yet clinical and abnormal psychology today offers no conceptual engagement with the concept of suffering. The lack of philosophical engagement with concepts like suffering points to the necessity of maintaining the claim of moral and political neutrality under which the bio-medical model and other scientific paradigms operate. Despite the overwhelming adaptation of the bio-medical model, in looking at the history of psychology as a discipline, it was not inevitable or necessarily evident that a fully positivist framework would be adapted.

The Discipline of Psychology

The main model of mental disorder today is defined by “*bio-medicalization*,” or a focus on biological and physiological measures to identify symptoms, make a diagnosis, and prescribe treatments, such as a focus on psychotropic medications, brain functioning, and genetic explanations of mental illness (Smith, 77, 2014). With the release of the DSM-III and new SSRIs in the 1980s, “the dominant perspective in psychiatry shifted to one in which psychiatric troubles were considered disorders rooted in brain chemistry and best treated with psychotropic medications” (Smith, 77, 2014). Both causal forces and bio-chemical mechanisms and processes are key to this model (Miller, 2004, 32). The bio-medical model relies on a positivist epistemology, where the medical, social, and psychological aspects of treatment are validated as useful, based on forms of knowledge in the natural sciences. The bio-medical model of mental illness has been criticized for its ineffectiveness in both treating and preventing an epidemic of many types of mental disorders. Andrew Scull writes in *Madness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Insanity* (2015) that those who suffer from psychosis are one of few populations in North American society whose life expectancy has seriously declined over the past quarter of a century, “one telling measure of the gap between psychiatry’s pretension and performance” (14).

Pathology and illness cannot purely be contained to a biological sphere and also inhabits the cultural. In Susan Sontag’s *Illness as Metaphor* (1978), Sontag analyzes the metaphorical and cultural associations of both tuberculosis and cancer, and suggests that these diseases were not

only psychologized, but that the way they are understood is affected by the social hierarchy of the body. Or that, “while TB takes on the qualities assigned to the lungs, which are part of the upper, spiritualized body, cancer is notorious for attacking parts of the body (colon, bladder, rectum, breast, cervix, prostate, testicles) that are embarrassing to acknowledge” (17).

Tuberculosis was not only associated with Romanticism, but the lungs were etymologically also associated with the idea of the spirit (*pneuma*). While Sontag’s work helps to illuminate that other illnesses also carry their own cultural and moral baggage, the hope that illness can be liberated from metaphor, or the social and cultural fully separated from the biological also implies there is an ideal scientific framework free from normative and moral judgements which can be reached. On the question of mental health, where this bio-medical model particularly becomes troubling is the lack of engagement with political and economic forces in shaping mental health outcomes and also how these mental disorders are defined, and what moral judgements are made in their conception.

Despite the dominance of the bio-medical model today, psychology is also a vast field of study which when looking at its history, does not necessarily carry determinants that make it inevitable for this model to have been cemented. Psychology developed conceptually by drawing from movements as varied as Phenomenology, Romanticism, and Existentialism, and in many ways evolved as a discipline out of philosophy (Miller, 2004). Early Existentialists such as Kierkegaard dealt with psychological phenomenon and conceptions of freedom in relation to Christian theology and the ideas of hereditary sin and the “fall” of man, devoting a whole work to the conceptual exploration of anxiety (Kierkegaard, 2014). Romantics such as Keats countered Rationalism by defining the concept of *negative capability*, “when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason,” or to experience doubt and irrationality, but still find truth through intuition (1817). Branches of psychology and psychiatry especially coincided with philosophy through Existential Phenomenology and the association and work between clinicians and philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Heidegger (Ratcliffe & Broome, 2012, 362). Another interesting example of the overlap between psychiatry and philosophy is the work of Ludwig Binswanger whose method of *Daseinsanalyse* was heavily influenced by Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. Binswanger used Heidegger’s notion of “Being in the World” to develop a “science of subjectivity” apart from dualistic interpretations of mind and body (Smyth,

2011, 93). Though works of Existential psychology and psychotherapy exist today, the earlier antecedents of Existentialism and Romanticism which explored psychology through subjectivity and structures of existence over psycho-pathology, would become the excluded countercurrent to the growing shape of psychology as a discipline. Enlightenment views on the new Rationalism linked emotion to primitive or animalistic instincts, while through Utilitarian theories—even morality could be portrayed as a naturalistic and scientific phenomenon (Miller, 2004, 81).

The androcentric nature of these theories of emotion and subjectivity is a key point that has also been outlined many times since Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* which demonstrated how the feminine is defined as Other in relation to a universalistic notion of an androcentric subjectivity (2011). One of the most infamous and gendered moments in the history of psychiatry was hysteria, where women were classified as ill due to the “mutable” quality of their bodies, as hysteria comes from the Greek *hystera*, or uterus, and denoted the negative consequences of a ‘wandering womb.’ With the etymological meaning of psychology being the study of the soul or spirit, it seems strange psychology even came to be justified on a purely scientific basis. As psychology became institutionalized as a discipline in the late 1800s it increasingly severed the connections between philosophical concepts such as *psyche* from psychology and made few attempts to account for the role of emotions in human behaviour (Miller, 32, 2004).

By the end of the 19th Century, psychiatry had fully attained the status of a discipline through its integration into others branches of medicine, the rise in clinics, and the professionalization of the field through the establishment of research chairs, journals, societies, textbooks, and conferences. Though positivism was the ideal model guiding social-based planning in psychiatric and psychological studies, many of the popular theories of the time amounted to a pseudo-scientific racism which had major impacts on racial hygiene policies and eugenics in the 20th Century. Hereditary patterns of mental illness were connected to the theory of degeneration or “degenerationism” in countries such as France and Great Britain. Degeneration theorists targeted populations who were not seen as productive workers or citizens and suggested that madness was genetic and would accumulate, becoming worse through successive generations. Pedlar writes that although “the idea of degeneration was originally a biological concept, it adapted easily to more figurative usage, providing a scientific foundation for the moral panic at the end of the century” (2006, 134). Max Nordau’s 1892 work

Degeneration called psychiatrists to action and targeted public figures like Oscar Wilde as proponents of the “degeneration” of society. Nordau wrote that degenerates occupy a “borderland between reason and pronounced madness” and “lack a sense of morality and right and wrong” (Pedlar, 2006, 134). In the fin de siècle period there was a sense that a type of atavism had taken hold of society, and degeneration theory was used to explain and medicalize “the increasingly unpredictable behaviour of radical individuals and the anonymous masses swelling in the streets of evergrowing cities” (Pietikainen, 2015, 126). Foucault defined this preoccupation with degeneration and decline as a kind of “pornography of the morbid” (1980, 53). A work that famously encapsulates these fears is Bram Stoker's *Dracula*, published in 1897. In Stoker's *Dracula* the mad character of Renfield acts as both the object of Dr. Seward's medical studies and the intermediary between the monstrous figure of Dracula and the human world (2000). The mad Renfield is the servant of and the closest human to Dracula, while the main advantage the “crew of light” had at their disposal to neutralize both Renfield and Dracula is described by Dr. Van Helsing when he claims that, “we have on our side...a power denied to the vampire kind; we have resources of science” (2000, 279).

While the theory of degeneration lost credibility in the early 20th Century, its influence could still be seen in eugenics, and genetic conceptualizations of psychological disorders. The beginning of eugenics is primarily associated with Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin who used a combination of statistics, evolutionary theory, and genealogy to suggest that “inferior” families should not be allowed to reproduce, as they were more likely to produce degenerate individuals. The more “hard heredity” idea that reproduction should be contained to the 'best' or 'good stock' of society gained ground in North America, Nordic countries, as well as many German-speaking parts of Europe. According to Petteri Pietikainen and his study of Madness, rather than viewing eugenics as an aberration in the history of liberal democracy, “eugenics was an intrinsic part of modernization especially in the Western hemisphere” (2015, 131). While eugenics is a broad topic of discussion that goes beyond this work, it is key to mention briefly in any study looking at the concurrents of psychology and Fascism, for both the extreme impact degeneration theory and eugenics had, and for the way it will resurface in studying these philosophers, particularly Foucault.

The most violent consequences of eugenic policies took place during the Second World War and the Holocaust. Eugenics were already a part of German health policy during the

Weimar Republic (1919-1933), but under the Nazi regime in 1933 the Sterilization Law in Germany set up a 'Genetic Health Court,' which ordered the forced sterilization of any patients deemed to have genetic disorders or deficiencies that could be passed on through reproduction. It is estimated today that approximately 400,000 people were forcefully sterilized through this program, and 200,000 people by 1937 alone. The sterilization program led to a euthanasia program (Aktion T4) in 1939, where over 70,000 psychiatric patients were killed in under two years. Victims of euthanasia were usually more likely to be working class, with less education, and without permanent jobs or families. Underlying the large scale of people sterilized and killed is the fact that “from 1933 onwards, the criteria for incarceration in a mental hospital included alcoholism, antisocial behaviour, homosexuality, political dissent, prostitution, vagrancy and disinclination to work” (Pietikainen, 234). Other major factors such as anti-Communism, anti-Semitism, and racial theories of supremacy motivated the Nazi regime and the ensuing “War of Annihilation” (*Vernichtungskrieg*). Yet, the scientific validation of theories of degeneration and eugenics generated an idea of purity and protection of the social body, while also leaving those who were disabled, or labelled as mentally ill dehumanized and vulnerable to further violence. It is also an often-repeated statistic that doctors were one of the most over-represented professions in the ranks of the Nazi party.

Defining Fascism Today

In situating Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari historically, and dealing with the contemporary rise of Fascism, it is key to explore what Fascism means today. Fascism is a contested term and has been used to describe varied political situations, to the point where some feel it is simply an inflammatory label put on anything one finds offensive. The more Liberal view and theory of Fascism would be the belief in what can be called a definition of “Historical Fascism,” or a Fascism that is relevant to a particular set of economic and historical circumstances from the time of 1919-1945, especially in Germany, Spain, and Italy. Another matter which complicates an appropriate contemporary definition is the use of the term “Totalitarianism.” In a North American context, the use of “Totalitarianism” often equates the Fascist with the Stalinist experience, despite the contrast and conflict in these ideologies and also often confuses Stalinism with all communist or Marxist movements. As will be seen in the discussion of Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari, Fascism has never been a static concept or phenomena. When considering the connection with psychology and how psychic forces are connected to economic conditions, Fascism is also not something that can be seen as “external” to the society under study, but also relates to social subjectivity and desire as a social force—though there may be disagreement in how these psychological forces are produced. Explanations of contemporary Fascism must be updated to express current societal and economic realities, but the fact that Fascism has never been truly eliminated also indicates that the historical definition and liberal view Fascism does not hold up and a deeper study needs to be taken to explain its ongoing resonance.

In Darko Suvin’s essay “To Explain Fascism Today,” he suggests that Fascism was not a deviation from capitalism, but a structural possibility and trend or result of it. While Suvin acknowledges that Fascism in different countries had varied cultural contexts (ex. the role of the Catholic church), he claims that Fascism does have deeper historical roots and generalizations can be made to determine and identify the preconditions for a Fascist movement or ideology. The key factors in Fascism are the activation of threatened middle classes with the support of a dictatorial ‘totalising’ organization, and the ideology of national superiority or blood (2017, 263). The socio-political thrust of Fascism historically lied in the pretence of uniting a whole nation while practically forging a class block between the rulers and tired sectors of the middle classes and neutralizing the working class and deviant political forces by terror and ideology.

While the more reductive Marxist perspective viewed Historical Fascism as simply another stage in monopoly capitalism, Suvin claims that an economic-psychological crisis is necessary for Fascism to develop, and in this sense, Fascism develops out of the decay of Liberal institutions and the failure of offering up political alternatives. Fascism is a “unique combination of the worst traits from all class societies; slavery for the ‘biologically inferior,’ feudal rule by the small local barons even over specific activities, and capitalist exploitation stripped of democratic curbs—a new historical monstrosity” (2017, 271). In Suvin’s view the main factors today which are influencing the growth of contemporary Fascism come from both a rise in militarization and violence, which have the consequences of both hollowing out the concept of citizenship and seeing war as the “father of all things” (2017, 276).

A key discussion which expands on the role of citizenship in a contemporary theory of Fascism comes from the Hungarian philosopher G.M. Tamás who has developed the theory of a “post-fascism.” Post-fascism “reverses the Enlightenment tendency to assimilate citizenship to the human condition,” or merge the highest level of humanity with citizenship (2000). “Post-fascism,” despite the name, does not mean Fascism is no longer a threat, but that it exists within different structures and without formal or military dictatorship. For Tamás, “post-totalitarian Fascism is thriving under the capacious carapace of global capitalism” (2000). Under historical Fascism in Germany, Jewish people were targeted for mass murder, but other targeted groups included the Roma, Communists, Gay men and LGBTQ people, and the mentally ill, who were all classified as non-citizen and therefore as non-human in the eyes of the state. On a more extreme scale in comparison to how there continues to be antagonism around policies such as affirmative action or diversity initiatives to address historical oppression, for Tamás, these categories of people were seen by the Fascists as part of the Enlightenment project of inclusion and the expansion of the rights of citizenship. While the marker of narrowing ideals of citizenship alone is not a complete theory of Fascism, racism and the delineation between citizen and non-citizen seems to have remained one of the most striking characteristics of Fascist thought, while the hollowing out of the concept of citizenship also relates to the decay or crisis of Liberal institutions. In Tamás' essay “On Post-Fascism: How Citizenship is Becoming an Exclusive Privilege,” he recounts that the classification of citizen vs. non-citizen is not a Fascist invention, but that “Fascism, having put an end to the bourgeois realization of Enlightenment (i.e., to egalitarian capitalist democracy), transforms the social exclusion of the unproductive

(from hermits and vatic poets to unemployable paupers and indomitable rebels) into their natural exclusion (i.e., extra-legal arrests, hunger, and death)” (2000).

The increasing restrictions on and privileging of citizenship is not hard to see either in a European or North American context. The high levels of deportations, and detention of immigrants in the United States, the desire to ban travel of people from predominantly Muslim countries, the plan to 'build a wall' between Mexico and the United States, and the rise of White Nationalist and Neo-Nazi groups (the so-called “Alt-right”), all point to both the narrowing of citizenship and the increasing normalization of racist diatribes in mainstream culture. While there is often the temptation to juxtapose Canada as more enlightened and liberal compared to the United States, rising racism is also an issue in Canada, not only because of the settler-colonial context, but also given the increase in Islamophobia and terrorist attacks like the Quebec City mosque shooting, motivated by “far-right” views. In Europe these issues are evident in both the militarization of borders to prevent immigration from refugees fleeing war in countries such as Syria and Libya, and the rise of Fascist parties and extremely xenophobic groups.

These parties are present in countries such as; Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Poland, France, Italy, Greece, and the Czech Republic, but other European countries such as Spain, also face the resurrection of Fascist ideas through the rise of revisionist history. In Austria the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is the governing party, while in Germany the Alternative for Germany (AfD), is the third largest party in the Bundestag and currently is polling as the second most popular party in the country (Deutsche Welle, 2018). In Poland, the annual Independence march on November 11th, 2017, saw 60,000 on the streets with slogans seen such as “Clean Blood,” and “Europe Will be White” (Wilczewska, 2017). Despite the fact that North America (particularly the United States), does not have the historical experience of Fascism, the sense of decline, revanchism, and the need to resurrect a national identity based primarily on ethnic lines are clear connecting themes and sentiments. Likewise, even though there is no great counterforce or threat in a communist or anti-capitalist alternative movement winning power throughout Europe, Fascist and xenophobic parties have coalesced and won support. Given the gap between historical Fascism and the present circumstances, the most important question is not about historical experience and patterns, but the importance of internal and psychic factors, as well as what is eternally violent in these societies which causes the Fascist ideology to continually resurface.

“To be sensuous, that is, to be really existing, means to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object, to have sensuous objects outside oneself – objects of one’s sensuousness. To be sensuous is to suffer. Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being – and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being.”

(Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844)

Analysis of Authors

To Keep the Soul in Psyche: A Marxist Humanist Approach

In exploring the work of Erich Fromm, first, an epistemological approach will be used to expand on the three main themes in this area of Fromm's work; his critique of Freud and place within psychoanalysis, the conceptual use of Alienation, and his conceptualization of the proper role and task of social psychology. The second historical approach will be applied to both contextualize Fromm as a philosopher responding to and motivated by the destruction Fascism brought to Europe and to examine his understandings of Fascism. Fromm's articulation of a critical psychology suggests that the most commonly accepted understanding of health is based on social necessity rather than a more intrinsic definition of health that focuses on human development or the flourishing of human nature. Fromm's views on Fascism are related to the development of what he calls the “authoritarian personality” and focuses on the psychological impact of conceptions of power, but alongside this, he also forms a study of a class-based “social character” which was more likely to support Fascism. The link between psychological study and Fascism in Fromm is evident in the way he discusses psychic forces and connects the rise in Fascism to the social character of a class which needed new identifications.

In many ways, Fromm's works fall into the tradition of philosophers trying to harmonize the writings of what is often called a “young” Karl Marx with the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud. In his 1962 work *Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud* Fromm writes that both Marx and Freud operate under the same assumption “that man lives with illusion because these illusions make the misery of real life bearable” (15). Freud is considered by Fromm to be a radical, but unlike Marx not a revolutionary thinker, while Fromm thinks Freud's greatest achievement was the discovery of the unconscious and “science of the irrational” (1970b, 6). Despite this contribution, Fromm also considers Freud to be “deeply rooted in the

prejudices and philosophy of his historical period and class” (1970b, 6). Freudian psychoanalysis was critical of existing psychiatric ideas and attacked the values of the Victorian age, especially “the notion that sex was not a subject for rational scientific investigation” (1962, 135). Freud may have examined the insincerity of Victorian morality, and the notion that there was no psychic and transcending consciousness, but his theories did not disrupt the existing social order. Freud was strongly representative of the urban middle class or bourgeois, and “tended to consider as neurotic anyone who deviated from this attitude, either to the left or to the right” (1962, 136).

One clear example of considering anyone “neurotic” who deviated from bourgeois norms was Freud's analysis of hysteria. Freud famously studied hysteria with Jean-Martin Charcot in Paris during the winter of 1885-1886 and came to the conclusion that hysteria was rooted in the original suppression of traumatic memories with sexual content. Freud linked hysteria to a “seduction” in early childhood and suggested to his colleague Fleiss that for hysterics, “in all cases, the father, not excluding my own, had to be accused of being perverse” (2013, xxiv). Hysteria then was linked to the violence of patriarchally organized families. Rather than using his findings to critique a culture which accepts violence or abuse within and outside the family, psychoanalysts like Freud used the ideological concept of the nuclear family to explain the roots of desire and formation for many types of psychiatric disorders, including hysteria. This was a problem in Fromm's eyes not only because of the evident misogyny in Freud's work, but also because Fromm then concluded that the aim of the Freudian “talking cure” was simply to help individuals adjust uncritically to circumstance, or to “reality,” which Fromm called “a state of mind in which one's individual unhappiness is reduced to the level of the general unhappiness,” with the aim of “adjustment” (1962, 139). While Fromm drops many of the prejudices and uncritical aims of psychoanalysis, what he takes from Freud to add to his Marxist analysis is the understanding that “social neurosis,” is possible, not just individual pathology, and that psychic forces have both a historical and social content.

Since psychic forces are historical, they are also subject to change overtime and are not fixed. According to Fromm, “psychoanalysis is, first of all, a dynamic psychology,” so to speak of psychic forces is to speak of social forces (1981b, 25). For a legitimate psychology to develop in Fromm's view it must be a social psychology, since psychic forces are collective. In Fromm's work, social psychology is also defined as a critical psychology, or “one critical of man's

consciousness” (1981b, 26). This critical psychology understands that “the social character is that particular structure of psychic energy which is molded by any given society so as to be useful for the functioning of that particular society” (1981b, 27). The social character of a society is not an inevitability, but the result of particular historical processes. The human psyche is molded for its use as productive force in the social process. Fromm uses the social character as the link between the material base and ideological superstructure in Marxism, to explain how people may act against their own interests and selves in order to protect the social order. In other words, “the social character is the intermediary between the socioeconomic structure and the ideas and ideals prevalent in a society” (1981b, 30). In *The Sane Society* (1955) Fromm points to the irony in isolating individual patients from their context, remarking that; “we look at them as strictly individual incidents, perhaps with some amazement that so many of these incidents should occur in a culture which is supposedly so sane” (1967, 13).

In the way that psychic forces can be seen to be both social and historical, as well as mediate between the base and superstructure, Fromm claims we can differentiate between individual and social pathology. The difference between individual and social pathology is demonstrated through the terms “defect” and “neurosis.” In *The Sane Society* Fromm proposes that a person who fails to gain freedom, spontaneity, and a genuine expression of self might be considered to have a severe defect. However, if these goals were not achieved by the majority of society, it would be considered a social or socially patterned defect. The individual shares these defects with many others and is not even aware of it, and the culture provides patterns to “live with defect without becoming ill” (1967, 24). This “pathology of normalcy,” normalizes a materialism that leaves people with “intense boredom,” since “man lives not by bread alone” (1967, 19). Fromm believes a society itself can be sick and that mental health can only be present when there is a satisfactory answer to the question of human existence. That consumerist or materialist values are prioritized by a society and seen as a social good does not make them sane, as “consensual validation as such has no bearing whatsoever on reason or mental health” (1967, 23). Ultimately, the social definition of health is an ideologically loaded concept and when “speaking of health in a sick society, one uses the concept of health in a sociological sense, as denoting adaptation to society” (1970b, 25). Social psychology in Fromm's work must be both critical and Humanist or built on some sense of objective human needs and a theory of human nature.

As a Socialist, Fromm used the term *Alienation* in a specifically Marxist sense, but from the perspective of a psychologist and psychoanalyst he believed that alienation constituted a kind of psychopathology and that “Alienation then, is, for Marx, the sickness of man” (1962, 48). While there is not necessarily a systematic psychological theory informing Marx's work, for Fromm, terms such as “the essence of man,” “alienation,” “consciousness,” and “passionate strivings,” were all examples of psychological concepts at work in Marx (1981b, 25). Fromm demonstrates that the etymology of alienation comes from an older meaning denoting insanity or madness (French: aliéné, Spanish: alienado), and an alienist in English referred to a doctor or early psychiatrist who cared for the mad or insane. Under the alienation of capitalism the economic and moral sphere are independent from each other and this creates the “core of the psychopathology of modern man” (1962, 53). In Fromm's understanding, the model of “Homo Consumens” emerges where the main goal in life is not even primarily to own, but to consume. Fromm sees this environment as counter to human nature, but he views human adaption to this as proof that “one can do almost anything to man, yet only almost” (1981b, 31).

Consciously, humans living as consumers may be happy with their lot in life, but “the more crippled society makes man, the sicker he becomes” (1981b, 30). In order to raise consumption, “new artificial needs are created and man's tastes are manipulated” (1981b, 32). With consumption as the dominant psychic force, psycho-pathological phenomenon such as overeating and buying, and other forms of addictive behaviour compensate for hidden depression and anxiety. Similarly, radical post-68 works like *Turn Illness Into a Weapon* by the Socialist Patient's Collective, went further to suggest health itself is as an ideological concept which centres primarily around the ability of an individual to work and participate in the labour force, “to be healthy, therefore, means to be exploitable” (1972, 6). The Existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre's introduction to their polemic connects increasingly high rates of mental illness in industrialized capitalist nations to Engel's assertion in *The Conditions of the Working Class in England* (1845), that a world was created “in which only a race of people can feel at home who are dehumanized, degraded, intellectually and morally debased to the level of animals, and physically morbid” (1972). This alienation and the hidden psychological “costs” of capitalism are what Fromm means when he claims anything can be done to man “yet only almost.”

Like Marx saw the undoing of capitalism inherent in the contradictions of the capitalist system itself, Fromm saw this more explicitly in human nature. Fromm writes that, “despots and

ruling cliques can succeed in dominating and exploiting their fellow man, but they cannot prevent reaction to this inhuman treatment” (1967, 26). Reaction could come about either in a creative response in working to bring about change, or a destructive response with the subjects of the system simply perishing, giving up, and dying off. Either of these outcomes would lead people to be unable to perform the functions necessary to serve the rulers of this system and maintain the status quo. Disobedience is for Fromm a virtue of human nature. When forced to live under circumstances contrary to human nature, which Fromm defines as adequate conditions which provide room for human growth and sanity, either this destructive or creative and productive disobedience will occur. Fromm believes that Marxism aligns with these Humanist ideals, and “its aim is the full unfolding of man's potentialities—not man as deduced from his ideas or consciousness, but man with his physical and psychic properties, the real man who does not live in a vacuum but in a social context, the man who has to produce in order to live” (1981b, 24). In this Marxist Humanist approach, value is in being or what one is, rather than what one has.

Fromm also believed that domination (capitalist or otherwise) could be enforced by threats of isolation. Both individually and socially “man's greatest fear is that of complete isolation from his fellow man, or complete ostracism” (1981b, 37). In his work *On Disobedience* Fromm claims that society's demands for repression are accomplished by the threat of the primal fear of ostracism. The more human a society, or complementary it is to human nature, the less need there is to choose between either isolation from society or isolation from humanity. Societies contain a given number of irrationalities that “result in the necessity for its members to repress the awareness of many of their own feelings and observations” (1962, 123). The necessity for repression becomes intense in unrepresentative societies, while the greater the conflict between human and social aims, “the more is the individual torn between the two dangerous poles of isolation” (1962, 127). That repression increases in more stratified societies, suggests that a certain degree of knowledge has to be repressed in order for the individual to accept their reality. Tolerating the pull of these two forces is accomplished by both intellectual and spiritual development, as one feels solidarity with humanity, they can more easily tolerate the threat of ostracism and vice versa. As seen in Fromm's view of human nature, there is something more primordial to his understanding of humanity that demarcates how he is able to separate the individual from the social. The ability of an individual to act on their own

conscience depends on transcending the limits of one's society, and embracing the idea of the self as a citizen of the world. Society is not necessarily representative of human nature, rather “the unconscious is the whole man—minus that part of him which corresponds to his society” (1962, 128). Therefore, in Fromm’s view, society’s definition of health is intrinsically tied to the reproduction of that society, not what is healthy by the standards of human nature. The extreme repression of feelings and observations increases in more unrepresentative society since the need to repress human nature also increases.

Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* first published in 1941 is his main work that investigates Fascism. While Fromm shares aspects of the Marxist analysis that Fascism developed with economic crisis and in response to the growing Socialist or Communist movements, he also believes there is a psychological or social character that enables Fascistic violence. *Escape from Freedom* mainly analyzes Nazism, or the German development of Fascism from a social psychological standpoint. The key characteristic of the Fascist psychology for Fromm is the relationship that develops with power. As will be discussed, Fromm connects these conceptions of power to the rise of individualism and individual attempts to bridge the gap between the self and the world. The authoritarian character as the “personality structure” of Fascism is for Fromm, characterized by either sadist or masochistic strivings and the stark view of a world divided into the powerful and the powerless. Finally, in his role as a psychoanalyst, Fromm picks up on the near compulsive destruction and cult-like obsession with death that Fascist ideologies share and relates this to the common element of misogyny that usually accompanies them.

To begin to outline Fromm's analysis of Fascism, it is key to start with the tension that Fromm identifies with the emergence of individualism under the new structures of liberal democracy and capitalism. For Fromm, the rise of individualism and new priorities placed on individual freedom saw many attempting to bridge the gap that arose between the self and the world. This amounted to seeking out new secondary bonds to make up for the loss of prior primary social bonds. This could lead the anxious individual to surrender their individuality or the integrity of the self in a desperation to bridge this gap. When this drive became compulsive, Fromm believed the Authoritarian personality developed. The most distinct forms of this authoritarian character are found in the interplay of submission and domination or masochist-sadist strivings. The masochist and sadist personality Fromm describes are socially dependent on the existence of the other. The masochistic personality is characterized by feelings of inferiority,

powerlessness, passiveness, and individual insignificance, while depending on outside powers to give the self definition. Life for the masochistic personality is seen as overwhelming and all events and powers are seen to come from outside the self, life 'happens' to them, and in extreme cases, masochism could lead to the belittlement of and forcing extreme suffering onto the self. In contrast, the sadist personality compulsively aims to make others dependent on them, desires absolute power over others, and sees others as instrumental objects. In this instrumentalization, the sadist wishes to rule over, exploit, steal from, and use others. In more extreme cases, this compulsion wishes to see and make others suffer. Despite this, the sadist depends on the object of their abuse and cannot destroy it. Fromm writes that the sadist element of authoritarianism is both less conscious and more rationalized in society, despite being more socially harmful.

The authoritarian character is the personality structure of Fascism, and ultimately the most important feature of it is the attitude towards power. In Fromm's understanding, the desire for power has been rationalized socially as either the “natural” inclination for security or seen as part of the Darwinian survival of the fittest. Theories of an innate human desire for power and sadistic tendencies normalize violent behaviour and contribute to theories of “evolutionary capitalism,” or the idea that capitalism is the inevitable outcome of a competitive human nature, not specific to particular and recent historical processes. For Fromm, “with the rise of Fascism, the lust for power and the conviction of its right [had] reached new heights” (1970, 183). While in a psychological sense, the desire for power may actually be related to an inability for the individual self to stand alone, or true weakness, under Fascist conditions might was confused with right and power taken to be strength. For the authoritarian, there are only two sets of people; the powerful and the powerless. Power fascinates the authoritarian not for any particular values that it represents, but simply because it is power. So, “just as his 'love' is automatically aroused by power, so powerless people or institutions automatically arouse his contempt” (1970, 190). This contempt is so extreme, that the “very sight of a powerless person makes him want to attack, dominate, humiliate him” (1970, 190). The concept of equality does not exist for the authoritarian personality, and ultimately there are only the superior and inferior i.e. powerful and powerless.

In defining the authoritarian personality, Fromm aims to describe both the character structure to which Nazism appealed, as well as the psychological characteristics of the ideology that made it such an effective instrument with regard to the same people. These psychological

bases are described as a “human basis” for which Nazism could occur, but not the cause of Nazi Fascism. Fromm writes that while one part of the German population accepted Nazism without resistance, but also without becoming admirers of Nazi ideology and practice, another part of the population became deeply attached to the new ideology and fanatically attached to those who proclaimed it. Fromm historicizes the psychic forces at work in this period to understand why Nazism mainly appealed to what he calls the “lower middle class strata,” or groups like shopkeepers, artisans, and white collar workers. For Fromm, the social character of this group was markedly different than both the working class and the nobility and upper classes. The influence of Calvinism made asceticism a leading value, emphasizing a merciless god and the damnation of part of mankind, while the principle of scarcity operated on both an economic and social level. In the Great Depression the middle classes were effected the most and Fromm identifies the disappearance of institutions such as the monarchy, the increase in women's rights and freedoms, and the new “social prestige” of the working class, as all factors related to the eventual authoritarian backlash and need to submerge individual identity back into a larger force.

Underneath the authoritarian character that Fromm defines there is a more general undertone of celebration of destruction and death in Fascist ideology. Fromm connects this identification with destruction to alienation suggesting that, “bureaucratic individualism tends to transform human beings into things. It tends to replace nature by technical devices, the organic by the inorganic” (1981, 56). Fromm discusses the Futurist Manifesto and Fascism in Italy, connecting the desire for war, destruction, death, and attachment to machines to misogyny, and more archetypically the denigration of “life.” One famous slogan illustrating this point being that of the Francoist-era General Millán-Astray, who adopted the slogan “¡viva la muerte!” or “long live death.” Fromm describes the love of death in the midst of living as the “ultimate perversion” (1981, 57) and claims that “there is indeed no greater distinction among human beings than that between those who love life and those who love death” (1981, 56). While there are some caught in between affirming life or death— “there are some who are true necrophiliacs—and they salute war and promote it, even though they are mostly not aware of their motivation and rationalize their desires as serving life, honour, or freedom” (1981, 57).

At Once Personal and Political: How the Margin Became a Myth

In turning to the works of Michel Foucault, his study on Madness seems to be somewhat peripheral to his more popular works, but the idea of normality/abnormality, deviance, and alterity are frequently reoccurring themes throughout his life's work, even if not always explicitly stated. Breaking with Fromm's reliance on Freud, works such as *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* focus on the moral theory that is embedded in the categorization of madness, while Foucault also criticizes the operations of psychiatric power as a whole in his lectures series *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974*. For Foucault and his genealogical study of madness throughout European history, there is a sense that medicalization and what he describes as the dialogue between reason and unreason has entailed an overall closing of the possibilities of what it could mean to be human. Foucault is not a philosopher often associated with theorizing Fascism, but his conceptualization of bio-politics is partly formulated as a response to analyzing Fascist ideology and how the idea of the social body played a large role in the Fascist state's structure in Germany. While it is suggested that Foucault eventually abandoned his work on madness because he came to believe that the “margin was a myth,” or that there was no conceivable outside to bio-politics, his work in this area highlights the epistemological problems that occur when models from the natural sciences are purely applied to complex subjectivities and psychological states.

In *Madness and Civilization* Foucault tracks the perceptions and uses of madness from the Middle Ages to the Classical period and finally, modern times. In the Middle Ages, Foucault describes the mad as leading wandering existences, being ritually exiled and expelled from towns and villages, or frequently handed over to boatmen who would take them away from the cities. This transitory existence is described as being “the passenger par excellence: that is, the prisoner of passage” (1965, 11). Access to church was denied to the mad, but not the use of sacraments. In these conceptions of madness there was a sense of “something which refers elsewhere, and to other things,” or that madness had a divine significance (1965, 58). Archetypes associated with the Middle Ages' understanding of madness were fools, prophets, mystics, and lovers. Madness was also associated with the danger of the “passions” and corporeal vices. The passions were viewed as the intermediary between the soul and body and the balance of the four Hippocratic humours was said to account for both illnesses and character i.e. a melancholic, or sanguine person. Near the end of the Middle Ages, madness began to be used as a more general

form of criticism and a symbol to express different anxieties. Moving into what Foucault called the Classical Age (the 17th and 18th Century), Madness was increasingly correlated with animality where “the animal in man no longer has any value in the sign of a Beyond; it has become his madness, without relation to anything but itself: his madness in the state of nature” (1965, 74).

Where Foucault begins to explain the economic and political factors influencing modern conceptions of madness is in his discussion of the “Great Confinement.” Foucault describes in both France and England how the introduction of poor laws and other measures criminalizing vagabonds and vagrancy led to new structures being built to house the poor, insane, unemployed, and prisoners. These structures grew quickly and in 1697 the first workhouse was built in Bristol, England, but by the end of the 18th Century there were 126 workhouses built in the country. Houses of correction, hospitals, and workhouses formed a new administrative and semi-judicial order. Foucault connects the introduction of these institutions to the imperatives of labour and what could also be described in Marxist terminology as “primitive accumulation.” Instead of the negative measures of exclusion which used to shun or exile the mad from society, confinement increasingly absorbed everyone into the new economic model. The anxiety around Madness was no longer in relation to either a reference to the Beyond or to pure animal instincts, but the anxiety around the figure of the madman was “because he crosses the frontiers of the bourgeois order of his own accord, and alienates himself outside the sacred limit of its ethic” (1965, 58). Doctors such as Philippe Pinel and William Tuke developed “moral treatment” and therapy centered around labour and proper work ethic, as well as the studies of math and sciences, rather than also exercising the imagination through studies of the arts or literature. In connection to the Great Confinement, poverty was increasingly viewed as the result of “the weakening of discipline and the relaxation of morals” and it was believed that proper work ethic could restore reason to afflicted individuals (1965, 58).

That many populations of the “underclass” were grouped together in the Great Confinement is not overlooked by Foucault, and he sees both the medical and legal aspects of these structures as falling on a medico-judicial continuum. Though medical and empirical explanations of madness claimed to be more humane and to free the mad from an association with guilt and criminality, madness maintained an implicit proximity to criminality and was also used to justify mass confinement. Whereas in previous eras in France the mad had sometimes

been put on display, confinement suggested a shame and a belief that “there are aspects of evil that have such a power of contagion, such a force of scandal that any publicity multiplies them indefinitely” (1965, 67). The threat of contagion from the mad was seen to be a problem of public morality, order, and a decaying influence on society. What Foucault called the “essential and most dangerous” madness rose from the poor depths of society and resisted bourgeois morality, “acting against the solidity of the family institution and against its most archaic symbols” (1965, 267). The moral implications of this is described by Foucault as “a terrible ulcer upon the body politic, an ulcer that is wide, deep, and draining, one that cannot be imagined except by looking full upon it” (1965, 202). Foucault suggests that ultimately the most dangerous madness rose from the lower classes and these dangers were cardinal sins committed against the bourgeois society: religious fanaticism, resistance to work, and theft.

After *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault's work in the early 1970s on madness directly addresses what he would call the apparatus of power itself, or a more micro-level analysis of the inner workings of asylums, the role of psychiatrists, and the doctor-patient relationship. In Foucault's view, the psychiatrist in the modern asylum from the 19th Century onward would no longer operate or justify their power and role based on truth, “but will switch resolutely, definitively, to the standpoint of reality” (2006, 132). As the “master of reality” the psychiatrist would be able to give Reality enough constraining force or power that madness could disappear as madness. The psychiatrist is someone who “must remove from madness its power to avoid reality” (2006, 132). The psychiatrist is described as giving a surplus-power to reality, or is responsible for the “intensification of reality” (2006, 132). Since psychiatry had constituted itself as a medical and clinical science, the question of the truth of madness was no longer at the heart of its cure and the question of truth was only posed within psychiatry itself. Psychiatric power is defined by Foucault as utilizing two forms of discourse; an “analogon of medical truth” which consists of clinical, classificatory, and nosological discourse, and an “anatomical-pathological knowledge” which describes the organics correlatives of illness (2006, 133). This psychiatric power is defined as first of all being concerned with managing and administering before therapeutic intervention.

Foucault also turned his attention to the agency of patients and their struggle against psychiatric power, as well as how psychiatric power had travelled beyond the asylum. One factor that showed the gap between the question of truth and actual psychiatric practice was the

problem that simulation presented to psychiatric power. Simulation, or the ability to distinguish real illness and neurosis from performance or from a madness that simulated madness “was the anti-power of the mad confronted with psychiatric power” (2006, 135). The problem of simulation is described as “the way in which hysteria simulates hysteria, the way in which a true symptom is a certain way of lying and the way in which a false symptom is a way of being truly ill” (2006, 135). Hysteria is used as the greatest example of anti-power and also anti-psychiatry in action, hysteria was in many ways an asylum-syndrome, or “a syndrome correlative to asylum power or medical power” (2006, 137). Foucault claims the performance of hysteria and the relationship it created between doctor-patient was not a pathological phenomenon, but a phenomenon of struggle within and outside the asylum itself, or a way to force the question of truth back onto psychiatry. Within the asylum there was a micro-physics of power between the mad person's body and the psychiatrist's body; the psychiatrist was responsible for both dominating and absorbing the mad person's body. Foucault describes this relationship between doctor-patient as being the subservience to both reality and to the regime of the asylum which was made to match the relationships, rules, and functioning of the outside world as much as possible. Psychiatric power had also been dispersed throughout other areas of society, and is “found wherever it is necessary to make reality function as power” (2006b, 189). The example Foucault gives here is how a psychologist will be present in a school when the knowledge the school offers ceases to be real to the students and they also need to be directed to back to this “reality.”

The fundamental concern over the dispersal of psychiatric power is related to both the disappearance of madness and what Foucault calls “Exteriority.” A short article titled “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre,” published in 1964 after the first French edition of *Madness and Civilization*, gives clear insight into Foucault's views on what the future of psychiatry and conceptions of mental illness would be. In this essay Foucault mentions the major French theatre figure Antonin Artaud, who was institutionalized several times and wrote the essay “Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society” (*Van Gogh le suicidé de la société*), a defence of Vincent van Gogh which claimed that “a madman is also a man whom society did not want to hear and whom it wanted to prevent from uttering certain intolerable truths” (1976, 485). Foucault imagines that in the future an artistic figure such as Artaud would belong to the “foundation of our language, and not to its rupture; neuroses will be placed among the forms that are constitutive of (and not

deviant from society)” (2006c). What Foucault describes is the effect of normalization and he suggests that in the future what used to be experienced as the limits of strangeness or the intolerable would join the society of the “positive.” Madness, which used to denote an “outside,” or an Exteriority would be placed in “a pale neutralised space” and effectively cancelled out (2006c). Though the actual works of someone like Artaud would be accepted, people would not also see themselves in the mad person behind them. The idea that Madness is the absence of an oeuvre or work, points not only to one of Foucault's theses in *Madness and Civilization* that madness was associated with the “idle” or seen as the inability to be productive or work, but also that a history of madness itself was absent and that madness was a limit or outside that could not be adequately captured through language. In questioning why historians had not introduced the topics of mental illness and institutionalization into their own areas of study Foucault claimed in an interview that it was necessary “for a 'twisted' person to have the bad idea of introducing questions at once personal and political” (Friedrich, 1981). The lack of understandings of these topics is also related to the stratification of these disciplines, and the continued belief that subjective experience cannot constitute a basis for scholarly work.

In the case of mental illness, Foucault writes that it will become part of a “technical substratum” and could either be viewed like any other organic condition, or that perhaps what would be accomplished could be the “precise pharmacological control of all psychical symptoms” (2006c). The definition of neutralised or depoliticized behavioural constraints and modifications would not suppress the development of mental illness, but would simply remove madness from culture, and all its subversive connotations along with it. Culture would not be distant from madness, but *in the distance of* madness—or still defining normality in relation to what is excluded from a culture, and thus not even fully understood. Overall, Foucault sees that while madness and mental illness became confused in the 17th Century they are increasingly moving apart linguistically and undoing their belonging to the same phenomenon. Mental illness is “set to enter a technical region that is increasingly well controlled: [while] in hospitals, pharmacology has already transformed the rooms of the restless into great tepid aquariums” (2006c). In contrast, “madness, the lyrical halo of sickness, is ceaselessly dimming its light” (2006c). While there are revolutionary changes made possible through Enlightenment thought, including combatting ideas of satanic possession or sin causing madness and illness, there is also the flip side of the reification of not only a certain conception of what it means to be human,

sane, or productive, but how this relates to the ideals of the bourgeois class, which Foucault describes in *The History of Sexuality*.

To turn focus from mental illness and madness, towards the work of Foucault on the subject of Fascism, it is helpful to begin with his understandings of how sexuality was integrated into the human sciences to arrive at the concept of bio-politics. Though his *History of Sexuality: Volume One* is concerned with how sexuality became a part of scientific and medical discourse, it is also connected to his understanding of the role of psychiatry and psychology. Like some would argue health is conceptually formed only in relation to what is first defined as pathological, for Foucault, the work of the science of sex was made up of the refusal to speak of sex itself and “concerned itself primarily with aberrations, perversions, exceptional oddities, pathological abatements, and morbid aggravations” (1980, 53). In Foucault's view, despite the neutral standpoint that science adopted, evidently there were “imperatives of a morality whose divisions it reiterated under the guise of the medical norm” (1980, 53). Drawing on the history of theories of eugenics, degenerationism, and evolutionary theory, Foucault writes about the preoccupation with the health of the overall social body along with a changing understanding of the role of the state. What he calls the medicine of perversions and programs of eugenics are defined as the two great innovations in the technology of sex in the second half of the 19th Century. These theories “promised to eliminate defective individuals, degenerate and bastardized populations” (1980, 54). To attain a certain social body, both biological and historical understandings justified state racism and defined women's bodies as intrinsically pathological, or “thoroughly saturated with sexuality” (1980, 104).

The intensified focus on the body and public health is viewed by Foucault as the self-affirmation of the bourgeois class. This self-affirmation is described as a technology of power and knowledge through which “the bourgeoisie underscored the high political price of its body, sensations, and pleasures, its well-being and survival” (1980, 123). While this may have involved social control and the political subjugation of other populations, in Foucault's work this is described not so much as a “negative” practice, but as an actual program and affirmation of self—a way of maximizing life. This focus on the body is seen as a class-based shift from the symbolics of blood to the analytics of sex. Whereas the old noble and aristocratic class relied on blood to assert the special distinction of their body, the antiquity of their ancestry, and the value of their family alliances, the bourgeois class relied on new technologies of sex or a *scientia*

sexualis to assert themselves. Themes from the nobility and their theories of superiority resurfaced in the 19th Century bourgeoisie, but in the guise of “biological, medical, or eugenic precepts” (1980, 123). This cultivation of health and the body was not simply a tool to maximize labour capacity, but represented something much deeper “politically, economically, and historically for the present and future of the bourgeoisie” (1980, 125). As previously stated, in Foucault's view this preoccupation with health and the social body was not due to just repression or restrictive capacity, but was evident of both a changing formation of state and understandings of sovereignty.

What Foucault titles bio-politics and the anatomo-politics of the human body are seen as indispensable to the development of capitalism. Bio-politics meant that the highest expression of sovereignty and power was no longer to kill, punish, or withhold, but to “invest life through and through” (1980, 139). The rapid development of disciplines and institutions such as; universities, secondary schools, barracks, and workshops, along with tools measuring birthrates, longevity, public health, housing, and migration, all signaled to Foucault the era of bio-politics. Law increasingly coalesced around regulatory norms which were incorporated across a spectrum of institutions or apparatuses, from the medical to the administrative. A society centered around normalization was seen as “the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life” (1980, 144). Unlike Fromm's analysis of the psychic interplay between the forces of sadism-masochism and the development of the authoritarian personality, Foucault does not see Nazism or Fascism as a result of repression or the social psychology of a certain class, but as the most extreme logic of the bio-political and administrative society. An outcome which is not an deviation from modernity. In the *History of Sexuality* Foucault describes Nazism as containing both the old form of the nobility's idea of superiority and the modern disciplinary power of new technologies employed by the bourgeoisie. Fascism in Germany contained both a program of eugenics and ordering of society based on biological grounds, as well as the exaltation of a superior blood and a state racism, though both seem to fit into the exclusion of groups defined as “sub-human,” or a biological danger. Similar to the brutal logic of colonialism long practiced outside of Europe by the Europeans, whoever is not citizen is subject, but in this case applied within Europe itself. In Foucault's view, “it is an irony of history that the Hitlerite politics of sex remained an insignificant practice while the blood myth was transformed into the greatest blood bath in recent memory” (1980, 150).

Materialist Psychiatry and the Social Production of Desire

In understanding suffering as not just an isolated or individual, but a social phenomenon, the concepts created by Deleuze and Guattari offer unique understandings of psychological life under capitalism and the persistence of Fascist ideas. As in Fromm and Foucault, there is a clear epistemological critique to purely naturalistic understandings of the problem of mental disorder, but whereas Foucault employs an genealogical response and Fromm a Marxist Humanist one, Deleuze and Guattari put forward a materialist philosophy. Psychoanalysis is also examined through their lens of “materialist psychiatry,” and they do so through the idea of the Body without Organs, a critique of Freudian ideas, and investigating the concept of Lack. Desire in Deleuze and Guattari's work is examined in relation to Fascism, but more broadly desire is defined as a productive sphere which is shaped in particular ways for the functioning of capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari quote Spinoza to illustrate this Fascist element in the operations of desire; “why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation? That is, how is it possible that people cry for 'More taxes! Less bread!'"?” In questioning how people can come to desire their own oppression, *Anti-Oedipus* disregards the Marxist thesis of false consciousness and suggests through the development of a “materialist psychiatry,” that psychic forces are not abstractions or externalities, but that “desiring-production is one and the same thing as social production” (1977, 28). *Anti-Oedipus* responds to both the popularity of psychoanalysis, and the continued support on some of the Left for Stalinism, which also encompassed social conservatism and hierarchical understandings of “legitimate” political action and thought. The chaos of *Anti-Oedipus* is informed by both this challenging of dominant strands of thought and the opening up of possibilities for the psyche.

Before turning to *Anti-Oedipus* and its critical contributions, the main definition of Fascism in these works will be explored. Guattari's essay “Everybody Wants to be a Fascist,” from this time period offers further insight and identifies Fascism as a key theme to use in approaching the question of desire in the social realm. Fascist desire is not conceived of as something only possible in military dictatorship, but is also explored in relation to Stalinism and the model of liberal-capitalist democracy. Fascism is not defined as entrenched in one historical context or political regime, but “what fascism set in motion yesterday continues to proliferate in other forms, within the complex of contemporary social space” (2009, 163). The term “Fascist

desire” indicates that Fascism has a psychic relevance and force and that there is a “fascism of the superego in situations of guilt and neurosis” (2009, 163). To this end, as will be seen in *Anti-Oedipus*, the anti-fascist struggle is not confined to political action only in the “public” sphere, but exists also as a “micropolitical anti-fascist struggle” (2009, 163). Like the other psychological forces discussed in *Anti-Oedipus*, Fascism also has a genealogy and permanence in social contexts and relations that goes beyond the historical characterization of Fascism.

While Guattari does not discount that the historical forms of Fascism in Germany or Italy had specific causes he questions how the dominant narratives around the history of the Second World War obscure the remaining problem of Fascism. Guattari suggests in the figure of Hitler, there were at least “four libidinal series” that crystallized a new desiring machine for the masses, or specific components which appealed to different layers of society. These are identified as; the populist style which appealed to those marked by socio-democratic and “Bolshevik” strains of thinking, the veteran-of-war style which both appealed to and neutralized the military, the “shopkeepers opportunism” that led to negotiation with industry and financial magnates—all while giving the impression that Hitler could be easily be controlled, and finally, racist delirium. The racism in Nazi Germany took the form of a “mad, paranoid energy which put [Hitler] in tune with the collective death instinct released from the charnel houses of the First World War” (2009, 166). In Guattari's view the narrative of real antagonistic contradictions between the Allies and Axis powers and the belief that the alliance of Western democracies and the U.S.S.R. formed to “save democracy” is not correct. Guattari writes that while the response of the Allied powers was due to the catastrophic realities that Fascism created, it was also in response to “the deadly form of libidinal metabolism which developed in the masses as a result of these experiments” (2009, 166). The destruction and mass appeal of Fascism was a threat to both Capitalism and Stalinism “because the masses invested a fantastic collective death instinct in it” (2009, 166). Like Fromm's suggestion that Fascism is the domain of those who revere death and have contempt for life, Guattari further claims that “all fascist meanings stem out of a composite representation of love and death, or Eros and Thanatos now made into one” (169). The war continued even after it was effectively lost and “Hitler and the Nazis were fighting for death,” up to and including the death of Germany (2009, 169).

In the aftermath of this apocalyptic scenario, “the last World War will thus have been the opportunity to select the most efficient totalitarian machines, those best adapted to the period”

(2009, 169). The optimal selection was the capitalist totalitarian machine, which unlike fascism managed to “divide, particularize, and molecularize the workers, meanwhile tapping their potentiality for desire” (2009, 169). Capitalism was then able to infiltrate not only the ranks of workers, families, the couple, and childhood, but the heart of subjectivity, dreams, and visions of the world. Here, the main concern again is returning to the question of subjectivity and psychology in relation to capitalism. Capitalism, described by Guattari as a “totalitarian machine,” is particularly good at inventing new desires and needs. Everywhere it searches for “structures capable of adapting desire to the profit economy” (2009, 170). Fascism and Fascist desire is described as a latent phenomenon, something that did not dissipate with the end of the war, but is constantly evolving “to the extent that it shares in a micro-political economy of desire itself inseparable from the evolution of productive forces” (2009, 171). Fascism may seem to come from an external force or the Outside, yet it finds energy “right at the heart of everyone's desire” (2009, 171).

The preface to *Anti-Oedipus* was written by Michel Foucault and characterizes the work as being concerned with the “strategic adversary of Fascism,” and not only historical fascism, but “also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (1977, xiii). In Foucault's view, *Anti-Oedipus* is a book of ethics or the *Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life*. That the work deals with Fascism “whether already present or impending,” and on the level of everyday life, suggests that Deleuze and Guattari see Fascism as something that develops out of ingrained behaviour, relationships, and patterns of thought, which stem from structures of domination, control, and exploitation. Foucault summarizes the main points in the work in a way that is both programmatic and deals with aspects of praxis, as well as philosophical, by looking at how Deleuze and Guattari's work breaks with the dominant figures of Marx and Freud. This is shown when Foucault characterizes the work as pushing back against both the 'sad militants' “who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse,” and the psychoanalysts, described as “poor technicians of desire” (1977, xiii). Political action is seen as something that should develop from multiplicity and disjunction, rather than unitary ideas, or subdivisions and hierarchies. Foucault suggests that the work invites the reader to “believe what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic” (1977, xiii). Or that useful political ideas cannot develop from static

dogmas, but have to be understood through experience and questioning the “pure order” of politics.

Anti-Oedipus is described as something that ideally resists the dogmas of the Left at the time, and works towards an opening up of the category of the human. It is stated; “do not demand of politics that it restore the 'rights' of the individual, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the product of power” (1977, xiii). As is common in many studies of Fascism, the work is also concerned with conceptions of power, and Foucault writes that it is a warning to “not become enamoured of Power,” and consists of a tracking down of Fascism, “from the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday life” (1977, xiii). In Foucault's view the effect of the Non-Fascist Life is the realization that “the flows and productions of desire will simply be viewed as the unconscious of the social productions” (1977, xviii).

Deleuze and Guattari further relate Fascism to their understanding of desire in *Anti-Oedipus* when they define two different types of libidinal investments: the paranoiac or fascisizing pole and the schizo-revolutionary pole. While the paranoiac element is described as an authoritarian type which “counterinvests the periphery” and “invests the formation of central sovereignty,” the schizophrenic element is described as a pole following lines of escape of desire, which causes flows to move (1977, 276). In Deleuze and Guattari's work the fixed subject is one that can only be maintained through social repression. In contrast, the schizophrenic subject is described as not believing in the Ego and being far past the problems that the Ego brings. Deleuze and Guattari suggest this escape or loss of Ego can have revolutionary consequences, “provided one sweeps away the social cover on leaving, or causes a piece of the system to get lost in the shuffle” (1977, 277). Foucault's introduction to *Anti-Oedipus* also suggests that “madness is a radical break from power in the form of a disconnection” (1977, xxiii). Or that the unfixed subject is a break with social repression and offers new understandings. In the system of machines described in *Anti-Oedipus*, “every machine is a machine of a machine” (1977, 36). Therefore, the break from power or from any of these machines is still a productive act and leads to productive reassemblies in themselves (1977, 36).

Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire forms the basis for their theory of materialist psychiatry as “desiring-production is the principal concern of a materialist psychiatry” (1977, 5). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that their theory of materialist psychiatry has two goals:

introducing desire into the social realm and introducing production or economy into desire. Deleuze and Guattari claim that production is an immanent principle of desire, meaning desire manifests directly in the material world. In this sense, “there is no particular form of existence that can be labeled 'psychic reality'” (1977, 22). Rather, “the order of desire is the order of production; all production is at once desiring-production and social production” (1977, 296). If desire itself is a productive material force and not solely about consumptive practices, “needs are derived from desires” (1977, 27). Defining the relationship between consumption and production in the work of Deleuze and Guattari relies on spatial theory to help breakdown how production and consumption are experienced both socially and individually. Consumption and production are not seen as oppositional categories, but the authors claim that “everything is production, since the recording processes are immediately consumed, immediately consummated, and these consumptions are directly reproduced” (1977, 4). A productive force is defined as “forces that no longer permit themselves to be contained in representation, and it calls forth flows and breaks that break through representation” (1977, 299). In characterizing this non-linear process of production and consumption, Deleuze and Guattari conceive of a complex system of connections and flux to explain how desire is connected to the production of reality.

The process of desire can be interrupted by the Body without Organs (BwO), a concept which appears in both *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. The concept of BwO relates to both psychiatric power and how Deleuze and Guattari conceive of subjectivity under capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari suggest the Classical body is an “organism,” or an organization of bodies and desire by patriarchal and medical forces based on “the judgement of God, from which medical doctors benefit and on which they base their power” (1987, 159). In Deleuze and Guattari’s view, a normative and androcentric understanding of subjectivity or the relationship between the mind and the body is exercised through medical authority. In contrast to the Classical body and patriarchal conceptions, the BwO is described as a limit “which is continually dismantling the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate, and attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an intensity” (1987, 4). Like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari looked to Artaud for inspiration and questioned the extent to which psychoanalytic forms of suppression (one example being psychic driving) and medical authority may simply reinscribe a normative conception of a unified subjectivity, productivity, and Ego that is useful for maintaining and reproducing the status quo.

Deleuze and Guattari assert that “where psychoanalysis says, 'Stop, find yourself again,' we should say instead, 'let's go further still, we haven't found our BwO yet, we haven't sufficiently dismantled ourselves’” (1987, 151). Deleuze and Guattari do not describe this dismantling as self-destruction, but see this dismantling as a disarticulation, or “to cease to be an organism” and organized on the lines of the Classical body. Like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari also look to recover what is subversive in conceptions of madness and alternative subjectivities.

This distinction between the BwO and the Classical body also implies a challenge to a Liberal conception of subjectivity and this challenge relies on the theory of Affect, described as “a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body's capacity to act” (1987, xvi). Deleuze and Guattari emphasize Spinoza's notion of affectio, where a state is “considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting body” (1987, xvi). Both mental and physical bodies are part of this affecting terrain, and the BwO, populated by intensities, is used to examine the ways in which psychiatric power readjusts the subject to a normative conception of subjectivity and Ego, while closing off new potentialities and experiences. The “judgement of God” uproots the immanence of desire, making the body “an organism, a signification, a subject” (1987, 159). The stratified and blocked BwO “swings between two poles, the surfaces of stratification into which it is recoiled, on which it submits to the judgement, and the plane of consistency in which it unfurls and opens to experimentation” (1987, 159).

The materialist critique of psychoanalysis is also shown in how the concept of Lack is questioned as a motivation or the cause of desire. In a materialist philosophy of psychiatry “lack is created, planned, and organized in and through social production” (1977, 28). Lack is not something that exists prior to desire, but it is a deliberate creation of social and economic forces, and “production is never organized based on pre-existing needs or lack” (1977, 28). Demystifying lack reinforces Deleuze and Guattari's point that there cannot be a psychic reality separate from a social production of reality on another level. Desiring-production and social production are both political phenomenon which are enacted materially. Treating belief as equivocal to desires misses how people may act against their own interests, desire their own oppression, and contradict their own beliefs, principles, and values. Beliefs becomes a main part of an already “unproductive unconscious,” rather than seen as having a material basis too (1977, 61).

The criticism of psychiatry in *Anti-Oedipus* also looks at psychoanalysis through Freudian conceptions of desire and the Oedipal complex. Deleuze and Guattari use the figure of the schizophrenic as an antagonist to the Freudian project and claim that the Oedipal complex presupposes a social investment of a paranoiac type which the schizophrenic refuses, while also refusing to be oedipalized. Likewise, “Oedipus presupposes a fantastic repression of desiring-machines” (1977, 3). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that in the schizophrenic the processes of desiring-production and social production are joined together, rather than fragmented. Schizophrenia is described as “desiring-production as the limit of social production” (1977, 35). The schizophrenic is represented through an excentric circle in contrast to the neurotic triangle of the Oedipus. The Oedipal triangle privatizes desire and for Deleuze and Guattari epitomizes the social repression of desiring-machines, as desire is described in a specific manner that is the creation of the adult world and adult fears, not the child's. The Oedipal triangle is seen as constructing desire as something personal, and imaginary so that “production is reduced to mere fantasy production” (1977, 55). All productive forces are seen as emanating from the Oedipal triangle. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that in this model of desire a “thousand break-flows of desiring-machines—all positive, all productive—are projected into the same mythical space, the unitary stroke of the signifier” (1977, 60).

In using the ideologically fraught concept of the nuclear family to explain desire and formation, “Oedipus is always and solely an aggregate of destination fabricated to meet the requirements of an aggregate of departure constituted by a social formation” (1977, 101). In this aggregate there remains only mother, father, and child, rather than a multiplicity of desire, which can be sexual or non-sexual, as libido comprises more than sexual drives. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the reoccurring question of the role of the Father and God in psychoanalysis is born of abstraction and assumes “the link to be already broken between man and nature, man and the world, so that man must be produced as man by something exterior to nature and to man” (1977, 107). The corrective and moral authority of the abstraction of Father and God, is what is also replicated in the role of the doctor, who is connected to state institutions such as prisons and judges. For Deleuze and Guattari, psychoanalysis has constituted “a microcosm symbolizing the massive structures of bourgeois society and its values” (1977, 93). The nuclear family is seen as a key form for the unconscious psychological repression of the child under capitalism. Rather

than emanating from the child's desires or ideas, Deleuze and Guattari again claim that Oedipus is first and foremost the idea of an “adult paranoiac” (1977, 274).

In “Schizoanalysis,” the programmatic response offered to psychoanalysis by material psychiatry, the authors claim there are three unavoidable conclusions. First, from the point of view of regression, “it is the father who is first in relation to the child” and therefore it is “the paranoiac father that oedipalizes the son” (1977, 275). Guilt is created by the father and projected onto the child before it is an emotion or inner feeling of the child. Deleuze and Guattari also claim that the model of regression encloses the family into a simple reproduction and generation cycle. From the view of materialist psychiatry “the family is never determining, but is always determined” (1977, 276). The family, particularly the construction of father-mother-child, is not a pre-existing social formation apart from economy or culture. Using familial relations as the determining factor in psychiatry imposes a predetermined structure as normative and undermines the importance of other social relations or production processes. Deleuze and Guattari attempt to show that the psychoanalyst is not a neutral figure that simply reveals the unconscious through castration and the Oedipal complex and can show the unconscious itself without any social context. It is not just the psychoanalyst as an individual who chooses this mode of representation, but “the psychoanalyst in us all” (1977, 297). The psychic forces the psychoanalyst uncovers and identifies not only have a historic character, but are also socially created.

Comparative Analysis: Humanism and Subjectivity

In examining the intersections between these author's ideas on psychology, psychiatry, and Fascism, there are both commonalities between these analyses and major points of contention. Epistemologically, the works of Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari studied here offer a critique to the positivist and naturalist understanding of mental disorder and human suffering. Fromm uses a Marxist and Humanist approach to look at the role of Alienation in industrial capitalist societies, and also suggests that the divide between the pathological and healthy is directly related to the values of a society and that societies themselves can be “sick.” Foucault uses a genealogical approach to examine the historical roots and meanings of madness and places the increasing medicalization and focus on the body into broader structures of biopolitics and psychiatric power. Deleuze and Guattari examine the psychic force of desire and connect this to social repression and the processes of production and consumption. While all

authors are critical of capitalism and motivated to look at the psychological affects of economic processes, a commitment to Humanism and the understanding of the subject is a central conflict between these works.

The tension here lies in the desire to affirm a universalist notion of the psyche or human nature, and the critical view on how this idea of 'human nature' is formed and may eradicate difference. Fromm's particular mode of Humanism and understanding of human nature is part of a Marxist understanding of emancipation and humanity as a "species-being." There is a sense of a better future that can be achieved when humans are supported to develop to the best of their capacities and innate sensibilities. Foucault is critical of Humanism and any essential concept of human nature (especially in the context of the Enlightenment) and sees the individual as a product of power-relations, revealing how certain subjectivities are pathologized or seen as deviant if they do not conform to the view of the individual as a Liberal subject. Deleuze and Guattari are also not concerned with affirming Humanism, but are more interested in concept-formation and developing new language to think of subjectivity and open up possibilities for multiple understandings of difference and subjectivity. Foucault's work captures something necessary to understandings of normativity in relation to mental disorder and subjectivity that Fromm's cannot, while Fromm's affirmation of psyche or the soul of humanity is a necessary tool for keeping explorations of social psychology centered on social transformation.

Health, in Fromm's work is stuck between society's notion of health and an intrinsic ideal of health correlated to his conception of human nature. Fromm believes that an individual is classified as healthy if they are "able to fulfill the social role he is to take in that given society" (1970, 159). Health from the standpoint of society is based on the reproduction of that society, the ability to start a family, and to fulfill social necessities. On the individual level, which Fromm believes corresponds with human nature, health and normalcy are defined as the optimum of growth and happiness of the individual. Most societies promote the individual and society-based concept of health with discrepancy between them, and as this distance grows, the society grows sicker. People who do not adapt to the sociological concept of health are seen as having less value by psychiatrists who do not also analyze the structure of society, and adopt the positivist view. The disconnect between the societal and individual understandings of health mean that the neurotic person can be healthier and less stunted than the person viewed as more normal who may have lost their individuality all together. Health for Fromm then is not a purely

ideological construction, but also indicates conditions and material circumstances which allow individuals to develop their own better natures.

Marxism here is part of both a social and individual emancipation. Marxism is defined by Fromm as Humanist, as he believes its aim is the full-unfolding of humanity's capacities and potentials. Marx saw his contemporary society as one where people had much, but inside were little. A key part of Marx's analysis which is often misunderstood, is that he did not just claim that the proletariat suffered and was exploited by the capitalist model, but also saw the bourgeoisie in acting as the oppressors, as themselves being diminished. The Humanist and normative psychology Fromm develops is interested in the divide between having and being, and suggests human nature is more concerned with being. Fromm is critical of the materialism and consumerism of capitalist society and how this develops new needs, desires, and consciousness for people, alienating them from their own nature. Critical psychology is “one critical of man's consciousness,” and therefore, new ethical norms and spiritual development is necessary to evolve consciousness towards different values, or for social psychology to be orientated towards social transformation. Fromm is correct that psychology needs to be socially based and must develop a set of ethics, especially in relation to the problem of alienation, but his lack of further analysis of normativity and its historical roots provides problems when considering Humanism more deeply, and how subjectivity is understood.

While Foucault's work is not explicitly Feminist theory or philosophy, he is much more interested in the idea of difference, looking at dualism, and challenging the Liberal conception of Humanism or view that the subject is a unified, rational, and autonomous individual. In the works studied here, this is evident in his discussion on hysteria and how he conceives of resistance to psychiatric-power. In Foucault's *Madness and Civilization* he discusses how “nervous disorders” and hysteric symptoms were classified in relation to a specific understanding of subjectivity. Diseases of the nerves were seen as diseases of sympathy and women's bodies were viewed as enclosing a “perpetual possibility of hysteria” (1965, 154). Women could fall ill from perpetual feeling and sympathy. These “diseases of the nerves are diseases of corporeal continuity” (1965, 154). Or in other words, a subjectivity that is also formed through relations with others and so cannot be unified and static. The hysterization of women's bodies is considered a key development in the technologies of sex that Foucault describes, where women were coded as “thoroughly saturated with sexuality,” and women's bodies were given an intrinsic

pathology, especially in relation to reproduction and family life. In Foucault's discussion of how hysteria operated within asylums he attempts to show that the relationship between patient and doctor is not just one between the powerful and the powerless, or a victim and victimizer, but that the patients also impacted how diagnoses were formed and symptoms “captured.” This agency is shown through discussions of simulation and how psychiatric power was evaded by the question of truth that simulation brought back onto the doctor. This is what Foucault called the “anti-power” of the mad and Foucault saw simulation and the performance of hysteria as a phenomenon of struggle within the asylum itself.

While Fromm looks at normativity in relation to either the distinction between social and individual views of health, and suggests there are normative ethics which conform to humanity's essential nature, Foucault investigates how normativity more broadly relates to understandings of subjectivity. Normativity is not seen in just the demarcation between the pathological and healthy, but is foundational to a conditional subjectivity that everyone is expected to embody, despite the vast differences between people's experience of the world and self-knowledge. Where this becomes further problematized is when this subject is conflated with humanity or human nature, giving license to exclude or dehumanize anyone who does not share this experience of the world. Certainly, this point applies theoretically to feminist and anti-colonial critiques of humanism, whether these groups resisted Humanism all together or aimed to develop the new “Human.” In relation to the history of psychiatry this point connects to how pathologization has frequently coincided with labelling or restraining those who act “above” the station society has granted them, and fully embody their experience of the world. Whether it is called subversion, deviance, or “anti-power,” the importance of affirming this history is what Fromm misses in his development of the idea of normativity and that this agency is seen in the work of Foucault is one thing that continues to make his work resonate today.

While Deleuze and Guattari fall alongside Foucault in questioning the dominant subjectivity that Humanism is coalesced around, their philosophy is less interested in critique and instead focused on producing new concepts and language. In offering a “materialist psychiatry” Deleuze and Guattari, like Fromm, are also searching for an ethical framework that psychology and psychiatry could exist under. While Deleuze and Guattari's analysis is more in contention with Marxism than Fromm's, they are also concerned with praxis. This is even noted by Foucault when he suggests that *Anti-Oedipus* is surprisingly and maybe to the dismay of its authors, a

book of ethics. Materialist psychiatry is aimed at identifying desire in the social realm and seeing psychic forces as connecting to the economic processes of both production and consumption. Since “there is no particular form of existence that can be labeled 'psychic reality.'” Deleuze and Guattari make a point to explain how an individual may articulate one set of principles and beliefs, but act in contradiction to those beliefs. Their explanation of how individuals may come to desire their own repression is critical of the Marxist notion of false consciousness and the Humanist ideal of an essentially rationally motivated, unified, and organized subject. The concept of the Body without Organs and “desiring-production” are all ways in *Anti-Oedipus* through which Deleuze and Guattari attempt to provide alternative ways for thinking about subjectivity. While *A Thousand Plateaus* is even more rife with conceptual creations like; multiplicity, rhizome, plateaus, and assemblages.

Another factor which explains why Deleuze and Guattari rely on a more “affirmative” program and the development of an ethics to discuss the connections between psychiatry, psychology, and politics is their wish to avoid representational thought and affirm materialism. In arguing against the reproduction of representational thought, Deleuze and Guattari claim that; “the question is not: is it true? But: does it work?” (1987, xvi). Meaning more so if the work is helpful for developing alternatives ways of living, rather than does it correspond with a direct representation of reality. The philosophy in the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* series is part of a more broader criticism of Western philosophy for relating “expressions and actions to exterior or transcendent ends, instead of evaluating them on a plane of consistency on the basis of their intrinsic value” (1987, 22). Representational thought is viewed as “State philosophy,” and “analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between these symmetrically structured domain” (1987, 22). State philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari “has never reached an understanding of multiplicity” and produces a dichotomous and binary logic, built on a strong principle of unity (1987, 5). So, while Deleuze and Guattari are also opposed to the Humanist view of a fixed human nature that Fromm endorses, they are also engaged with ethics and attempting to provide frameworks for understanding the psyche as a social concept and for this transformation to be emancipatory, which is much less evident in Foucault's analysis.

In returning to the historical approach of the works under study, Fascism is relevant to both the Post-war context these authors are writing in and the concern with psychology that informs their theoretical basis. In all cases, Fascism is related to class, critiques of capitalism or

structures of power, and not defined through the lens of Historical Fascism. Fascism is seen as something that is not just related to one set of economic circumstances or crisis, but also has a basis in subjectivity. The problem in applying these analyses to the contemporary rise in Fascist or Neo-Nazi groups will lie in the divide between Historical Fascism and Fascism defined as a response to more general psychic and economic forces. For Fromm, the rise of Fascism was related to a “social character” of a particular class and the development of the authoritarian personality. The social character Fromm describes is most relevant to Historical Fascism in Germany. However, Fromm's description of individual alienation and the revanchism that these destructive identifications often follow, also seems to have contemporary relevance. In Foucault's writings Fascism is not an anomaly in the history of liberal democracy, but is connected to the new social body formed in the image of the bourgeois class, technologies of sex, and the advent of the administrative bio-political society. Foucault acknowledged that these technologies were transient and would change overtime, but the bio-political control of populations is also still seen in claims to the racial “purity” of the social body. In Deleuze and Guattari, Fascism has a historical form that was particular to certain conditions at the time, but is also a latent force which continues to operate in the totalitarian capitalist system. While there is merit to a historical analysis in more specific contexts, the reappearance of this problem under very different circumstances also reiterates the point that Fascist ideologies have wider significance than was once thought.

In Fromm's view the social subjectivity of Fascism in Germany was related to the need for a class which had been displaced, or lost previous economic privileges, to reaffirm their identity through a powerful authoritarian force. In the transition to a more individualistic model of society, individual powerlessness, alienation, and isolation made these identifications more likely to have a destructive basis as “destructiveness is the outcome of an unlived life” (1970, 207). Since the time Fromm is writing in, the power to make economic changes and decisions by democratic elections in individual states has also been increasingly delinked from the nation-state model to international bodies and capital, making this perhaps a new instance of powerlessness for the average person, and arena in which social bonds are displaced and there is an anxiety to reaffirm them. Globalization has promoted the free flow of goods, while the flow of people has come up against borders which have become more stratified, divided, and militarized. Destructive and Fascist identifications, especially on ethnic lines, have followed the model of

concerns over citizenship that Tamas outlined in his theory of “Post-Fascism.” For Fascism to have a social base, there is no longer the need for formal dictatorship or military control as “post-totalitarian Fascism is thriving under the capacious carapace of global capitalism” (2000). While the specific “social character” Fromm describes in relation to Germany is a historical one, the sense of reactivity to a perceived loss in privilege in the middle classes is relevant for describing Fascist resurgence today. White Nationalist and Nazi groups affirm a White-only conception of citizenship and as Tamas describes, also fall along the lines of reversing the Enlightenment project of inclusion into the concept of citizenship and socially excluding others to the point of “their natural exclusion (i.e., extra-legal arrests, hunger, and death)” (2000). Yet, as Tamas writes, the linking of citizenship to the height of humanity is not a Fascist invention, but a larger contradiction and problem within liberal democracy itself.

In Foucault's view, the most racist societies were also likely to be the most violent and destructive. Foucault analyzes Fascism as being based on both the nobility's claim to “blood” as justifying their ruling superiority and the bourgeois classes' production and solidification of their own body through technologies of sex. Even prior to the Fascist era in Germany, the Weimar Republic practiced a eugenic ordering of society, and Fascism extended and intensified these micro-powers while the “blood myth was transformed into the greatest blood bath in recent memory” (1980, 150). While the transient technologies Foucault described have certainly changed, the belief in the protection of the social body and discourses around birthrates and the fear of the disappearance of the “white race” seem to be relevant to the technologies of sex he outlines in *History of Sexuality*. This analysis could also relate and be applied to Fascist ideologies around gender and the reaffirmation of women as only being socially relevant in the role of mothers and caregivers. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault also cautions against the “fascist in us all,” suggesting that these destructive drives have a wider relevance in relation to economic forces and organization.

In Deleuze and Guattari's analysis Fascism should not be the “historian's speciality;” but what the Fascist experience set forward continued to proliferate in other spheres. Therefore, it was not enough to just politically identify as “anti-Fascist” or link Fascism to one historical circumstance that had been defeated by the forces of democracy. Fascism also took place on a micro-political level, involved other social institutions, and the continuation of hierarchies, exploitation, and domination on all levels. The Non-Fascist life in this case involves the more

difficult task of everyday life and interpersonal relationships. New ethical frameworks needed to be created. Fascism could not be dismissed as a phenomenon “outside” or “over there,” but had to be seen as only possible through socially produced desire that found its energy “right at the heart of everyone's desire” (2009, 171). What was totalitarian about capitalism in this instance was that it would continue to search out for proper structures and “structures capable of adapting desire to the profit economy,” and whether these structures reinforced Fascist-desire had no bearing on their operations (2009, 171).

New Developments: The Control Society and Psycho-politics

Given that each analysis studied is related to evolving economic and technological circumstances and how psychic forces form and interact with them, new developments should be examined to further relate how the intersections of psychology, psychiatry, and Fascism can be understood today. Mental illness has also increased to what some would consider “crisis” levels and as seen in the statistics relayed earlier, is a more common and growing occurrence. Another issue in applying the epistemological insights from these authors is that technologies such as big data and algorithms have evolved to make quantification and positivist applications more commonplace in all levels of society, as well as to operate on a more profound level than what mere statistical analysis can capture. Related new developments will be explored through Deleuze's essay “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (1992) which builds off of Foucault's previous analysis of disciplinary societies and attempts to describe how new institutions and modes of control are emerging. Another relevant author to discuss in updating the context of these analyses is the philosopher Byung Chul-Han whose recent works *The Burnout Society* (2015) and *Psycho-Politics* (2017) build on both Foucault and Deleuze to analyze the new technologies of Neoliberalism in relation to mental health outcomes. Han's analysis offers insight in describing social subjectivity under Neoliberalism, but his work under-analyzes the structural causes of these symptoms. The technologies Han describes are new modes of capitalist accumulation and suggesting that these transformations result in an “auto-exploitation” which obliterates and internalizes the Master-Slave dialectic, obscures any useful understanding of class in the basis of these technologies. While it is clear that an increase in precarity, competition, and the downloading of social to individual responsibility may lead to the “achievement-subject” Han describes, it is also undefined in Han's work at which point some of the exhaustion and burnout he describes acts also a refusal to the compulsion of constant productivity or amounts to

Fromm's suggestion that the adaptability of human beings always has its limits, and either a constructive or destructive disobedience will arise.

In the essay “Postscript on the Societies of Control” Deleuze describes facets of what might be recognized to be typical characteristics of Neoliberalism today, but the essay is centered on describing a broader crisis in the transformation of institutions from the disciplinary society to the control society. Issues that relate to the relationship between the psyche and economic processes mentioned in this essay include: a change in the economy of attention and cognitive functioning to a more fragmented level, an increase in debt-based economics, an increase in competition, as well as the belief in “meritocracy,” or merit-based salary. In Deleuze's view the disciplinary society from the 18th and 19th Centuries reached its heights in the 20th Century and post-Second World War transitioned to a society centered on control, rather than discipline. The disciplinary society was based on the “organization of vast spaces of enclosures,” and the individual could only pass from one enclosed space to another (1992, 3). As Foucault states in *History of Sexuality* this society is predicated on a bio-politics aimed at administering and organizing life, rather than a sovereign power based on the threat of death or exclusion. The disciplinary society included institutions such as hospitals, school, the factory, and family, but the prison was the analogical model and the main aim of the environment of enclosures was “to concentrate, to distribute in space; to order in time; to compose a productive force within the dimension of space-time whose effect will be greater than the sum of all its component forces” (1992, 3).

The conception of space changed from the disciplinary society's differentiated enclosed spaces that an individual could walk through from one to the other, as independent variables, to mechanisms of control and space that acted as inseparable variables. In the control society Deleuze describes this power as operating as “free-floating control” (1992, 4). An example Deleuze gives being that the enclosure of the school is replaced with perpetual and ongoing training. Instead of the prison as the main analogous-model the control society is an analogy to the corporation “and the corporation is a spirit, a gas” (1992, 4). Power is described as both less tangible and identifiable, but more all encompassing. The corporation is a “metastability” that presents the brashest rivalry as a motivating force and “a healthy form of emulation” (1992, 5). Individuals are increasingly pitted against one another “dividing each within” and one is never finished with anything productivity-wise (1992, 5). Attention and how one focused their

cognitive energies became fragmented, while economic precarity increased. In the disciplinary society there were two distinct and separate poles, that of the individual and the mass, in which a number or an administrative numeration would indicate their position within a mass. In the control society this shifted to where “power individualizes and masses together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body” (1992, 5).

In terms of technological changes, Deleuze writes that increasingly individuals have become represented as quantified data. They were increasingly “dividuals” rather than individuals and could be used to represent masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks.” Deleuze also describes the impact of Neoliberal economics and outsourcing of production with the “soul” of the corporation changing from concrete production to marketing. In this economic system the subject of control is in constant network, flux, and orbit. Under the deluge of financialization “even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank” (1992, 6). The transition to the control society is also marked by an increase in debt, and indebtedness being tied to subjectivity. Deleuze returns to the question of how ideas of health and the social body changed from the disciplinary society to the control society and writes that there will be a “new medicine” that singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk “which in no way attests to individuation—as they say—but substitutes for the individual or numerical body the code of a 'dividual' material to be controlled” (1992, 7).

In Han's *Burnout Society* (2015) the transition from the disciplinary to the control society is not as strongly connected as in the work of Deleuze to particular structural and economic changes, but describes a general affective shift in psychic forces caused by the increased deployment of emotions in a kind of “affective” capitalism. In Han's view both the control and disciplinary society are still effectively based on the “negative” or governed by “no.” In contrast, contemporary neoliberal society operates on positivity and the “violence of positivity does not deprive, it saturates; it does not exclude, it exhausts” (2015, 7). This excess of positivity is described alongside excessive stimuli, information, impulses, and a fragmented economy of attention, and “the society of achievement and activeness is generating excessive tiredness and exhaustion” (Han, 2015, 31). However, in following Foucault's work, the disciplinary model is already moving away from a sovereign power based on the threat of exclusionary measures, and so is already “positive.” Though the desire to maximize production continues to act as the social

unconscious, the invocation has changed from what others “should” do, to what they “can” do. Han suggests that the epidemic of burnout, exhaustion, and depression are the results of a burned out soul which is constantly being pressured to achieve, belong, and continually become oneself. Han's analysis in *Psycho-Politics* (2017) suggests that capitalism more frequently relies on techniques of emotional and affective capture and control. Neoliberalism deploys emotions as “resources in order to bring about heightened productivity and achievement” (2017, 45). Foucault's notion of Bio-politics is used to describe the governmental technology of disciplinary power, but somehow this is still described as power based on negative measures, while the control Deleuze recounts is instead aimed at the psyche and constitutes a kind of “psycho-politics.”

That people in this state of Neoliberal competition become “divided within” as Deleuze claims is echoed in Han's conceptualization of the “achievement subject” which is described as having internalized the master-slave dialectic. Yet, whereas Deleuze clearly sets the groundwork for institutional change and the shift to neoliberal and financial capitalism in how he contextualizes people in a growing state of flux or orbit, Han's analysis seems to inadvertently individualize these problems when he suggests that, “the depressive human being is an animal laborans that exploits itself—and it does so voluntarily, without external constraints” (2015, 10). The epidemic of psychic maladies such as depression and burnout are seen by Han as representing “pathological signs that freedom is now switching over into manifold forms of compulsion” (2017, 2). What exactly this prior freedom is that has been eroded by the excess of “positivity” into compulsion is undefined, but it may be the awareness of exploitation itself. It is clear that the logic of free exchange or freedom to enter into agreement provides little substance for understanding the context these agreements take place in or their outcomes, i.e. self-exploitation. For Han, the compulsion to exploit one's self or auto-exploitation, suggests “people are turning their aggression against themselves” (2017, 6).

An example which can offer insight into both Han's “psycho-politics” and the conceptual problem that the abstract idea of “self-exploitation” represents is the recent Cambridge Analytica scandal, where it was discovered that tens of millions of Facebook user's data was obtained by a private third-party working with the Trump campaign on its election strategy. While it can be argued that the technologies of big-data and social media more specifically are used willingly by users who agree to certain terms and conditions, for work, self-promotion, leisure, and social

connectivity, the uses of user-generated data for private profit and political purposes suggests that this data-mining of the “soul” or intensive psycho-graphics is not driven by individual “auto-exploitation,” but is a clear example of capitalist accumulation in a new realm. To suggest users drop out from these platforms as solutions, use analogue technology, or to romantically advocate as Han does to “returning to the inner animal, which doesn’t consume or communicate unfortunately” ignores the structural problem of democratic control of these technologies and does not guarantee a transformation in mental health outcomes (Geli, 2018). Here politics is not only resting on the basis of psycho-graphics and the intensive harvesting of voters deepest hopes and fear, but this positivist application imagines the complexities of these voters as mere “mathematical outputs” and psychological vulnerabilities to be exploited (Chen, 2018).

If as Han claims “auto-aggressivity means that the exploited are not inclined to revolution so much as depression” it is also worth considering the political ramifications of mass burnout and exhaustion (2017, 6). Han's description suggests there is level of self-unawareness in this self-exploitation. In Fromm's discussion of the adaptability of human beings, he suggests that almost anything can be done to human beings “yet, only almost.” Fromm writes that, “despots and ruling cliques can succeed in dominating and exploiting their fellow man, but they cannot prevent reaction to this inhuman treatment” (1967, 26). Response to this domination either takes a creative and productive disobedience in attempting to change this system, or a destructive form in people simply becoming exhausted and perishing. Might it be more useful to think of the symptoms Han describes as not the “destruction of the human soul,” but more what Fromm classifies as disobedience, albeit in a reactive and self-destructive form? In this way Han's category of compulsive and abstract “self-exploitation,” like the model of bio-medical application, removes the individual from the social body and seems to also obscure a structural understanding of the new technologies he describes.

While Han discusses the increased deployment of affects and emotions in capitalism, he does not clarify the role of emotions or desire as a social force in politics, or where this destructive “burnout” can lead besides self-exploitation. Or how this burnout can coalesce into social destruction. It is clear that Fascist movements also respond to and manipulate fears and frustrations by uniting people under the guise of national or racial superiority, while practically further creating divisions between people, neutralizing the working class and alternative political forces, and scapegoating the most marginalized communities as somehow responsible. The

widespread exploitation of fears and frustrations needs to be responded to with a sustained understanding of the powerlessness, alienation, and disempowerment many people feel. As has been shown in this work, some examples which offer insight might be the Marxist approach to Alienation Fromm describes in motivating the social identifications with something larger and destructive, or Deleuze and Guattari's suggestions that Fascism is a socially produced desire, so that these problems are not displaced and simply called the ignorance of some others. Fascism still remains a structural possibility under capitalism in response to economic and psychological crisis and to ignore this possibility would be more even more destructive.

Conclusion: Towards a Sane Society?

Regardless of technological changes and a shifting economic model, on an epistemological level, the critiques Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari make about explanations of mental disorder from a positivist standpoint remain even more relevant today. In shifting from bio-politics to a much more technologically advanced capitalism that increasingly deploys emotional and affective methods, the “belief that life admits measurement and quantification governs the digital age as a whole” (Han, 2017, 60). While Big Data “opens up the prospect of absolute knowledge” this data-driven quantification of all of reality “is driving Spirit from the realm of knowledge” (Han, 2017, 68). Spirit is driven from the realm of knowledge and as seen in the history of psychology the concept of psyche is emptied of its content of soul, becoming just another measurement for mental performance and productivity. Despite these technological advancements, it remains true that “sensation is the enemy of quantification. There is no machine, yet, to which a nervous system can submit to transform into a sufficiently descriptive measurement” (Boyer, 2015). That being said, the problem remains with what to do with suffering once it is freed from the strictly medical realm. The point of this philosophical investigation has not been to advocate for the view of “anti” anything, or to follow the theoretical threads of an “anti-psychiatry,” i.e. suggest people forgo all psychotropic medication and medical interventions, or to deny the life-saving value these responses do have in some circumstances. The aim in freeing mental suffering from the strictly medical realm is to address the social functions of illness and see suffering as also a social phenomenon. Despite the pretensions of an objective scientific paradigm the bio-medical model, it is not free from the workings of larger social and economic models or from making morally grounded claims on how people ‘ought’ to behave.

Another issue which arises today that has changed the landscape of these fields of studies is the increase in diagnostic categories and medical language which often sanitizes how we talk about violence. An example where medicalization has operated in the sanitization of language and the 'dividual' mode Deleuze describes, is the concept of trauma. The diagnostic of trauma is an interesting example for both the ways it has evolved from its initial conception to the broad personal and social experiences it now describes. The etymology of trauma literally translates as “wound” and prior to the 19th Century, in a medical context, trauma referred to actual physical blows ex. blunt force trauma. The term began to be psychologized through neurologists such as Jean-Martin Charcot and his diagnosis of “traumatic hysteria,” and the German neurologist Paul Oppenheim's diagnosis of “traumatic neurosis.” In a contemporary North American context, psychic trauma became a diagnosis in the third edition of the DSM in 1980 with the condition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD is historically linked to the experiences of war veterans and soldiers, drawing on the previous category of “shell shock” that was experienced during the First World War with the introduction of heavy artillery. Symptoms experienced by survivors of sexual violence, domestic abuse, and instances of political and state violence (such as imprisonment or torture), were also integrated under the PTSD umbrella.

While this medical diagnosis validates a range of human suffering, it also conflates widely different categories of experience all under the idea of a psychic woundedness which seems to also repress and disassociate our awareness away from horrible events. From an epistemological standpoint, Trauma theory addresses and identifies the newly traumatized subject as experiencing the break between the previous promise and potential of the world with the new post-trauma reality of the world (Freedman, 2006). The subject not only undergoes a shattering of the self, but a shattering of the world and the “subject of trauma theory is characterized by that which it does not know/remember” (Radstone, 2007, 20). Present in this wide application of trauma to so many different experiences is the problem of epistemic legitimacy. Traumatically informed subjects are depicted as irrational and developing their claims based on experiences that are clouded by fear and emotion, and therefore lack legitimacy (Freedman, 2006). The experience of a social wrong or violence may generate trauma, but continually codifying such wide referents of systemic problems into a generalized medical experience, seems to present both an ethical problem and to promote the epistemic erasure of

what these accounts can say about the reality of violent events which are often publicly repressed.

The trouble remains with what to formulate as a philosophical and programmatic response to both the prior insights gained from this study of Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari and the changes in terms of technology and economy, as well as the increased reliance on the bio-medical model and sanitized language, which also makes psychoanalysis much less of an issue in critique of the dominant model. If, as Foucault claimed the “margin is a myth” madness no longer has a reference to an alterity and autonomous response of the subject, but the large increase in more common illnesses such as anxiety, depression, and addiction also suggests that these responses do encompass a refusal and disobedience of their own, even if it is not a constructive one. This also aligns with Pelbart's description of bio-politics and the state of bodies today as those which simply cannot take “anymore of that which coerces, from the outside and from the inside” (2015, 33). It is undeniable that the mass epidemic of mental illness has roots in larger social and economic problems, but this also needs to be connected to a programmatic response. As, in the long run “healing depression with artificial euphorization cannot work and sooner or later the depressed organism will collapse” (2016, Berardi).

In examining the uses of these works today critical analysis is necessary, but concept-formation in the realm of political philosophy and theory and finding productive ways to talk about the relationship between psychic and economic forces is also key. Social change cannot occur without emotional investment, and as previously stated, taking emotions seriously in the formulation of a political program does not have to mean the manipulation of fears or frustrations that accompanies Fascist and far-right movements. Fromm's use of social psychology and keeping the soul in *psyche* seem necessary for anyone interested in social transformation and addressing the root causes of growing rates of depression, anxiety, addiction, and other mental disorders. While the Marxist critique of capitalism and Alienation as its psycho-pathological counterpart remains the most relevant way to understand the shifting relationship between subjectivity and economic forces. Through the study of Deleuze and Guattari it is evident that sometimes the most thoughtful response is not “is it true,” but does it work? This is also prescient when the goal is to address the mental health epidemic on a long term and future-oriented basis, rather than search for quick-fix solutions that do not address socio-political circumstances that enable this epidemic. In looking at the uses of Foucault there is

both the analysis of psychiatric power which shows how medicalization disperses into other levels of society and the genealogical analysis of the absence of Madness' "oeuvre" which continues to make more research on this topic necessary. As Fromm suggests, in not looking critically at the "sanity" of a culture itself; "we look at them as strictly individual incidents, perhaps with some amazement that so many of these incidents should occur in a culture which is supposedly so sane" (1967, 13). In putting the social back in the economy and the soul back in the psyche, ideally we come to recognize that this epidemic does not need to be the "new normal" and is not reflective of a very "sane society." Rather, in finding creative and productive responses of disobedience we can see as Oscar Wilde writes that; "pain is not the ultimate mode of perfection. It is merely provisional and a protest. It has reference to wrong, unhealthy, unjust surroundings. When the wrong, and the disease, and the injustice are removed, it will have no further place."

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